Nationalism in Afghanistan: Colonial knowledge, education, symbols, and the World Tour of Amanullah Khan, 1901-1929 by Shir, Jawan
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Masters Theses The Graduate School
Spring 2012
Nationalism in Afghanistan: Colonial knowledge,
education, symbols, and the World Tour of
Amanullah Khan, 1901-1929
Jawan Shir
James Madison University
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019
Part of the History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shir, Jawan, "Nationalism in Afghanistan: Colonial knowledge, education, symbols, and the World Tour of Amanullah Khan,
1901-1929" (2012). Masters Theses. 324.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/324
  
 
 
 
Nationalism in Afghanistan: Colonial Knowledge, Education, Symbols, and the World 
Tour of Amanullah Khan, 1901-1929 
Jawan Shir 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of  
 
JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY 
 
In 
 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
 
For the degree of  
 
Master of Arts  
 
 
 
History  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2012 
ii 
 
Dedication 
 
 
 
 
 
To Afghanistan’s mountains, rivers, trees, and animals; whose existence is more 
Afghan, whatever ‘Afghan’ means, and more human than nationalism  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
I owe thanks and appreciation to a number of people that provided me helpful and 
critical support in making this thesis possible. I am grateful for the support and questions 
of the History Department faculty members and my graduate classmate colleagues. I owe 
much, intellectually and professionally, to my thesis director, Professor Shah Mahmoud 
Hanifi. Without Professor Hanifi, I would have never written this thesis (and perhaps 
would have never tried to know about its subject). My Thesis Committee Members were 
Professors David Owusu-Ansah and Timothy J. Fitzgerald. Their questions and notes 
have improved significantly this work. I am thankful to Professor Steven Reich, the 
coordinator for the Graduate Program. He has been supportive throughout my stay as a 
graduate student. I would like to also thank Dr. David Jeffery, Dean of the College of 
Arts and Letters; Dr. Lee Sternberger, Executive Director of the Office of International 
Programs; and Ms. Pamela Hamilton, the Coordinator of the Adult Degree Program. 
They all made it financially possible for me to complete my graduate studies at James 
Madison University. I am also thankful to Hirad Dinavari, the Reference Librarian of the 
Iranian World at the Library of Congress where he helped me to find Afghanistan’s 
sources that are not yet catalogued, unfortunately.  
 Although I discussed my thesis throughout the process with my father and I 
received important intellectual support from him, I am thankful to all of my family 
members whose distance from me like all distances of Afghanistan was part of what I 
tried to understand and write in this thesis.  
 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Dedication………………………………………………………………………………..ii 
 
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………iii 
 
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….v 
 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………..vi 
 
I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………….1 
- The Argument…………………………………………………………………3 
- Defining Nationalism in Afghanistan…………………………………………4 
- The Organization……………………………………………………………...7 
- Theorizing Nationalism……………………………………………………….8 
 
II. Chapter I: Colonialism and Nationalism in Afghanistan………………………...15 
- The Origins of Nationalism in Afghanistan: Colonial Knowledge………….15 
- Mountstuart Elphinstone: Baba-ye Afghan Invented ...................................22 
 
III. Chapter II: Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan………………………………31 
- Habibullah Khan, 1901-1919………………………………………………...31 
- Amanullah Khan, 1919-1929………………………………………………...41 
- The Problems of Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan…………………….45 
 
IV. Chapter III: Reforms in Education……………………………………………….48 
- Conceptualizing Modernity…………………………………………..……...49 
- Mohammad Abid: The Indian Muslim Spy, Traveler, Teacher………….…..50 
- The Importance of Education…………………………………………….…..55 
- Habibya College, 1904……………………………………………………….57 
- Curriculum…………………………………………………………...58 
- Organization………………………………………………………….69 
- Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...76 
 
V. Chapter IV: Symbolizing Afghanistan, 1919-1929……………………….……..78 
- Internally Symbolized Afghanistan……………………………………….…79 
- Externally Symbolized Afghanistan: ………………………………...……...86 
- Amanullah Khan’s World Tour: India, Egypt, and Europe……........89 
 
VI. Conclusion: Nationalism in Afghanistan; A Colonial , and Elite Idea………....112 
 
VII. Bibliography……………………………………………………………………116 
 
v 
 
List of Figures 
Afghanistan’s and its Surrounding Countries Political Map……………………………...1 
Afghanistan’s Current Administrative Divisions………………………………………….2 
Habibullah Khan’s Personal Vehicle…………………………………………………….34 
Map of Asia, Used in Education System in Afghanistan, 1915-1929…………………...66 
Map of Africa, Used in Education System in Afghanistan, 1915-1929…………………67 
Map of Europe, Used in Education System in Afghanistan, 1915-1929………………...68 
Awards’ Chart for Primary Education………………………………………………...…74 
Neshans or Medals……………………………………………………………………….81 
Afghanistan’s Flag, 1919-1926…………………………………………………………..83 
Afghanistan’s Flag, 1926-1929…………………………………………………………..84 
Amanullah Khan’s Approximate Trip Routes, 1927-1928………………………………86 
Amanullah Khan Speaking in Jashan-e Isteqlal 1928 in Paghman……………………..110 
Amanullah’s Khan Brother, Enyayatullah Khan……………………………………….111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
Abstract 
 Nationalism in Afghanistan has not received attention from the scholars of the 
country despite its significance, at least locally. Using a post-modernist analysis of 
nationalism, this thesis will study nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of colonial 
knowledge, class, and cultural institutions between 1901 and 1929. Chapter one is about 
colonialism and its impact on nationalism in Afghanistan. In the nineteenth century, 
colonial activities constructed the political, epistemological, and territorial foundation of 
Afghan nation. Chapter two shows how previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan 
have explained nationalism in the country. As the review of the previous studies of 
nationalism in Afghanistan will show, the previous explanation is hegemonic and state-
centric. Chapter three, the primary findings of this thesis, is a study of the reforms in 
education and its relationship to development of nationalism in Afghanistan. As a result 
of the reforms in education, the Afghan state was able to produce and patronize a well-
composed class of roshanfekran or elites in Kabul. Chapter four is about the symbols and 
Amanullah Khan’s eight month world tour that became useful tools of the Afghan state 
and the nationalists to legitimate their nationalistic programs inside and outside 
Afghanistan. In the conclusion, the thesis draws attention to its findings, and suggests that 
further studies of nationalism in Afghanistan will be useful; especially studies that will 
address the relationships between class, ethnicity, and language and nationalism in 
Afghanistan.  
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
(Figure 1) 
Afghanistan’s and its Surrounding Countries Political Map 
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1
 "Afghanistan Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library Online." University 
of Texas Libraries. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html (accessed February 22, 
2012). 
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(Figure, 2) 
Afghanistan’s Current Administrative Divisions 
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The Argument 
 
This thesis’s argument is twofold. One is that nationalism in Afghanistan was a 
colonial idea, though the Afghan state and nationalists adopted it locally as an Afghan 
idea. The creation of an Afghan nation was more a British, Russian, and Persian 
consensus than an Afghan one. Throughout the nineteenth century and long afterwards, it 
was these colonial powers, particularly the British, who arranged among themselves to 
create an Afghanistan. Indeed, the area that is “now known as Afghanistan,” as one study 
wrote, “had no previous existence as a united, independent political unit” before the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
3
 Another study has also concluded that “Afghanistan 
is in fact a colonial construct in political, economic, and intellectual terms, at least.”4A 
last but not least argument is made by a scholar of the country that the very labels 
“Afghan” and “Afghanistan” are constructed by the foreigners, not the Afghans 
themselves.
5
 However, Afghan nationalists rejected the argument that Afghanistan was 
constructed colonially. They claimed that Afghanistan existed as a nation not only in the 
nineteenth century but also since “man came down from the caves and hills to the fertile 
banks of rivers and civilized valleys, which the soil of Ariana, the ancient Afghanistan, 
was one of these valleys.”6 The second part of this thesis’s argument is that nationalism 
                                                          
3
 Benjamin D. Hopkins, The making of modern Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 11-13.  
4
 Shah Mahmoud Hanifi, Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and 
State Formation in a Colonial Frontier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).    
5
 Mohammad J. Hanifi, “Editing the Past: Colonial Production of Hegemony Through 
“Loya Jerga” in Afghanistan,” Iranian Studies. 37, no. 2 (2004), 322 
6
 Ahmad Ali Kohzad, Tarikh-e Afghanistan: The History of Afghanistan (Kabul: Matb-e 
Maiwand, 2008), 12. For a similar and more specific assertion by the Afghan nationalists see Mir 
Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar’s Afghanistan Dar Masir Tarikh: Afghanistan in the Course of 
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in Afghanistan was a state-sponsored and elitist idea. Its practitioners—the nationalists—
were a small elite group that was patronized by the state. Unfortunately, this thesis will 
not focus on the ordinary people. Rather, it concentrates on the Afghan elites and their 
nationalistic works. Therefore, the entire discussion about nationalism in Afghanistan is 
not about the ruled Afghans, the dominated Afghans, and the unknown Afghans. The 
only hope, which this thesis has, is to find out about them and remember them while it 
discusses the ruling, the dominating, and the known Afghans.  
Defining Nationalism in Afghanistan 
From the turn of the twentieth century until the year 1929, nationalism in Afghanistan 
was noticeable in the hegemonic institutions of the Afghan state—schools, newspapers, 
laws, and national public ceremonies such as the National Unity Day, Independence Day, 
Loya Jerga or the Grand Assembly—and  writings of Afghan nationalists. The concept of 
“hegemony” means here “that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas.”7 
Indeed, when the twentieth century started, the Afghan state began not only to legitimate 
its rule by force, but also by ideas. These ideas were instituted in the state’s hegemonic 
institutions such as the schools, the army, and the ceremonies that propagated an 
‘Afghan’ national idea. The country’s first constitution (1923) defined and territorialized 
Afghan nationality in its article eight: har sekha nafar-e che pa mulk da afghanistan ka 
de, pa har din aw mazhab che wee, tabean aw da rayat da afghanistan balal kizhee. This 
new national idea, “that everybody who was residing in Afghanistan without regards to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
History (Kabul: Markaz Nashr-e Enqelab, 1987), 9 and 36-38. In these pages Ghobar dates the 
history of Afghanistan as old as 2,500 B.C. 
7
 Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and The Theory of Hegemony,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 36, no. 2 (1975), 351 
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their religious beliefs and affiliations was an Afghan citizen,” is one example of the 
development of nationalism in Afghanistan during the early decades of the twentieth 
century.
8
   
While this new national idea that everybody-is-Afghan and Afghanistan is da 
afghanano watan or the homeland of Afghans was propagated by the Afghan nationalists 
as the foundation for national unity and identification,
9
 they also disregarded the 
argument that Afghanistan was a colonial construct. Eein watan-e aziz Afghanistan or 
this dear homeland of Afghanistan, wrote Kabul,
10
  “has been neither the land of 
Persians, nor Turks, nor Indians, and nor Chinese.”11 This kind of expression that 
Afghanistan has always been an Afghan land was in clear contrast with the country’s 
historical and political as well as intellectual characterization. It has been traditionally 
identified and argued by the outsiders
12
 that Afghanistan was a creation of the British and 
Russia. In the nineteenth century the British view or policy was to create the modern 
territory of Afghanistan as a ‘buffer’ polity between British India and Russia to prevent 
any Imperial Russian advances eastward towards India. Russia, on the other hand, viewed 
the creation of a ‘buffer’ Afghanistan as a barrier to keep the British away from Central 
                                                          
8
 Government of Afghanistan, Asasi nizamnamah da luwar dawlat Afghanistan: 
Afghanistan’s Constitution, (Kabul: Matb-e Shirkat-e Rafiq, 1923), 5 
9
 Ghobar (1987), 794 
10
 Kabul was the literary magazine of Anjuman-e Adabi Kabul, the Kabul Literary 
Society that was established in 1931. Kabul magazine and Salnamah-e Kabul, Kabul Annual, the 
two Persian publications of Anjuman-e Adabi Kabul, were established to “reform and consolidate 
the methodologies and forms of literature” in Afghanistan and “write” the history of the historical 
poets of Afghan nation. See Anjuman-e Adabi Kabul’s Salnamah-e Kabul (1932) 109.  
11
 Ghulam Jilani Khan Azimi, “Nazar-e ba Jughrafya-ye Watan: An Opinion about 
Geography of the Homeland,” Mujala-e Kabul, (1932-33), 42  
12
 Hopkins (2008), 61-62 and 108-110. See also Vartan Gregorian’s The Emergence of 
Modern Afghanistan (California: Stanford University Press, 1969), 118. Gregorian offers a useful 
but short discussion of the “buffer” idea of an Afghanistan.  
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Asia. However, the Afghan nationalists rejected the argument that Afghanistan was 
created by Britain and Russia. For them, Afghanistan was a tarikhi-e Afghanistan or the 
ancient Afghanistan, which existed as a nation prior to the nineteenth century’s British 
and Russian colonial activities in the country. They argued that Afghanistan’s “ancient 
name was Ariana; the oldest name of Afghanistan that lasted from 5,000 B.C until the 
fifth century A.D.” In addition to Ariana that was Afghanistan’s ancient name, the 
Afghan nationalists argued that “Afghanistan’s other historical name was Khurasan that 
lasted from the fifth century A.D until the nineteenth century.”13 Crafting and inventing 
history for Afghanistan and making the country an ancient place, which belonged always 
to Afghans, were important activities of the Afghan nationalists and the state in order to 
make a national history far older and historical than colonialism. As a matter of fact, the 
Afghan nationalists and state preoccupied themselves throughout the period under study 
here with the attempts to disregard politically and intellectually the fact that Afghanistan 
was a colonial construct.  
Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar (1897-1978), the foremost Afghan historian, 
introduces his famous book afghanistan dar masir-e tarikh or Afghanistan in the Course 
of History with the argument that it is a manufactured view to argue that Afghanistan is a 
colonial construct. He wrote in the preface of the book “that the orientalists and their 
imitators played with the history of nations of Asia and made it ardent toy of colonialism. 
They defamed the historical facts and events with lies and fallacies and drew a slanderous 
picture of them.” However, what was most important for Ghobar, to note here, was not 
                                                          
13
 Ghobar (1987),  9 
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the history of nations of Asia and elsewhere. He was concerned and preoccupied more 
with the characterization, representation, and understanding of Afghanistan’s history. He 
wrote that Afghanistan’s history was slandered by the orientalists who defined it as:  
A new born country; created by the desires of the two imperial governments of 
Russian Tsar and British Empire. This new born country, with thousands heterogeneous 
tribes, tens of different languages and religious sects, has no history before the eighteenth 
century. And…and…and. These kinds of colonial propaganda and fabrications, which 
various books adopted them in depicting Afghans and Afghanistan’s history, especially 
the British and later the western writers who took them as granted, and even also were 
enacted in the official minds and writings of our Asian neighbors, became a fatal 
epidemic disease.
14
 
 
 As it can be observed from Ghobar’s aggressive disregard of the idea that 
colonialism constructed Afghanistan, the Afghan nationalists introduced Afghanistan as 
an ancient country, and rejected the idea that Afghanistan was a colonial construct in 
order to invent locally a national idea. 
The Organization 
This thesis has four chapters. Chapter one, Colonialism and Nationalism in 
Afghanistan, will address nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of colonialism during 
the nineteenth century. The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce how certain 
colonial activities created the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan. Chapter 
two, Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan, will review the historiography of nationalism 
in Afghanistan. The goal is to explain how previous scholarly works have approached 
and characterized the development of nationalism in Afghanistan. The core discussion of 
the thesis is presented in chapter three, titled Reforms in Education. The intention in this 
chapter is to discuss the relationship between nationalism in Afghanistan and education 
between 1904 and 1929. Chapter four, Symbolizing Afghanistan, is about the symbols and 
                                                          
14
 Ibid, 1-2  
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ways, which were used by the Afghan state and the nationalists to project a national 
identity inside and outside Afghanistan. At the end of this thesis, the section of 
conclusion will summarize the findings of the research. The specific time frame for this 
paper is 1901-1929. 
Theorizing Nationalism 
Because of flaws in its historical imagination, dissimilarities and contradictions in its 
meaning and context, and ambiguities in its definition, it is assumed here that 
‘nationalism’ is an idea, and nationalisms, like nationalism in Afghanistan, are modern 
ideas.
15
 The idea of an Afghan nation, therefore, is a modern phenomenon. As a matter of 
fact, the phrase “Afghan Nation” appears in the subtitle and table of contents of 
Afghanistan’s first major colonial account, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul in 
1842.
16
 There is no usage of such a phrase as “Afghan nation” before its appearance in 
the Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, though Henry Vansittart and Sir William Jones, 
the two British colonial officials who have written commentary articles on Afghans, use 
in their writings the term “nation” to refer to Afghans. However, they do not have used 
like the author of An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul the phrase Afghan nation. Also, 
                                                          
15
 See Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 5-9.  Hechter talks about the difficulty of having one origin, one meaning, and one 
definition for “nationalism.” He writes that it was Johann G. Herder, the eighteenth century 
German thinker who first used the term “nationalism” in one of his texts. However, it has never 
been given a clear definition to what nationalism is. Therefore, since then it has been an 
ambiguous term, which has in turn motivated many writers, whose various definitions have 
allowed them, to “offer quite different assessments of it,” 6.  
16
 This thesis’s author has not seen the first edition of An Account of the Kingdom of 
Caubul which was published in 1815, and its second edition in 1839. So, whether those editions 
had the phrase “Afghan Nation” in their subtitles and table of contents is not known to him. The 
phrase, which the author, Mountstuart Elphinstone, of An Account of Kingdom of Caubul, spells 
it, is “Afghaun Nation.” The Account and Elphinstone’s impact on nationalism in Afghanistan 
will be fully discussed in the first chapter.  
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the first person to use intellectually the word ‘nationalism’ in reference to Afghanistan 
was Hans Kohn (1891-1971).
17
 Kohn, a subject of Hapsburg Empire, historian, lawyer, 
and an active Zionist,
18
  published apparently one of the first intellectual works on 
nationalism, especially with specific reference to Asia. He commented on nationalism in 
Afghanistan in his book, A History of Nationalism in the East (1929). Although he treated 
collectively nationalism in Iran and Afghanistan under one title, “Changes in Persia and 
Afghanistan” without an explanation to how they were alike and or different, his 
argument was that “the Afghan tribes, warlike and barbarous, have always been animated 
by a spirit of primitive nationalism and independence.”19 He suggested however that 
“even-today the government, industries, and social institutions of Afghanistan are all 
together medieval, as they were in Persia until quite recently. The spirit of rationalism, 
and democracy, and capitalism [that are pre-conditions for existence of nationalism] has 
hardly touched these countries and their populations.”20 However, beyond the primitive 
and medieval character of nationalism in Afghanistan, what made nationalism in 
Afghanistan really interesting for Kohn were the westernization and modernization 
reforms of the Afghan ruler, Amanullah Khan (r.1919-1929). Under “Aman Ullah Khan,” 
                                                          
17
 Hans Kohn, whose and several other nationalism theory pioneers’ works and analyses 
were found biased, Eurocentric, and incomplete, wrote a seven page description of nationalism in 
Afghanistan. For Kohn’s and other pioneers’ biased analyses of ‘nationalism theory,’ see 
Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998), 16-18.  
18
 For biography of Kohn, his Zionist writings and activism, and works on nationalism, 
see Leo Baeck Institute Collections at the Center for Jewish History, “Hans Kohn Collection, 
Papers of Hans Kohn,” Identification Number AR 259/MF 493, 
http://findingaids.cjh.org/?pID=121445 and 
http://www.cjh.org/p/93?action=searchPartners&partner=3 (accessed 12, Jan, 2012). 
19
 Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1929, 341 
20
 Ibid, 319  
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wrote Kohn, “a period of reforms imposed from above began in Afghanistan, similar to 
what Peter the Great attempted in Russia and the Turks in their country.”21  
However, Kohn’s explanation of nationalism was classical. According to the new 
studies of nationalism, classical theories and explanations of nationalism were incomplete 
and biased because many of them were first of all Eurocentric, and second of all they did 
not have in consideration a lot of the changes in the studies of postcolonized societies 
whose nationalisms needed new kinds of analysis. Therefore, this thesis uses a 
postcolonial, modernist, and post-modernist approach to its analysis of nationalism in 
Afghanistan. The approach is adopted from the works of three nationalism theorists: John 
Breuilly 1994, Benedict Anderson 1991, and Anthony Smith 1998. 
In contrast to the primordial and perennial theories of nationalism, the modernist and 
post-modernist theory of nationalism argues that nationalism and nation are modern 
concepts.
22
 However, the primordialists of nationalism theory argue that nations always 
existed naturally in the past. The task of a nationalist at the present is to “remind his or 
her compatriots of their glorious past, so that they can recreate and relive those glories.”23 
Like primordialists but also different from them, the perennialists of nationalism theory 
argue that nationalism has a perennial character: “nations and ethnic communities are 
                                                          
21
 Ibid, 342.  Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929) is the key personality in this thesis along 
with a number of other individuals.  He and his works will be discussed in all of the five chapters: 
especially 3 and 4.  
22
 For a comprehensive survey of modernist theory of nationalism see Smith (1998), 
especially chapters 1 through 6. 
23
 Anthony D. Smith, “Gastronomy or Geology? The role of nationalism in the 
reconstruction of nations,” Nations and Nationalism, 1, no. 1 (1994), 18. 
11 
 
 
 
cognate, even identical phenomena.”24 What distinguishes primordialism from the 
perennialism theory of nationalism is that the former sees nations naturally born and 
insists on the natural difference of one nation from another while the latter does not see 
nations as naturally born.
25
  
However, Breuilly (1994) and Smith (1998), the two modernist and post-modernist 
theorists of nationalism, reject the assumptions that nations and nationalisms always 
existed in the history.  “Those historians who claim that a national consciousness existed 
in medieval Europe or that there were patriots active in the sixteen century,” Breuilly 
writes, “their claims should not be labeled as nationalism.”26 Like Breuilly, Smith also 
suggests that “before the modern epoch, nations were largely unknown, and human 
beings had a multiplicity of collective loyalties.” 27 A person had to be loyal to his or her 
religious community or to a city or an empire or a monarch.  In addition to the view that 
modern nation-states did not always exist, the post-modernist theories of nationalism 
argue that “the outlook of most human beings was strictly local” before the emergence of 
the modern nation-states. Therefore, the modernist and post-modernist theory of 
nationalism suggests that nation is a modern phenomenon, and its creation goes to the 
emerging high culture of the industrial societies. The high culture is the situation that in 
order to be a nation, the people of a certain territory need to have access to mass public 
education system as this kind of system was becoming popular and increasing with the 
                                                          
24
 See Smith (1998), chapter seven, pages 146-169 where he discusses the theories, and 
problems of primordialism and perennialism nationalisms.  
25
 Ibid, 159.  
26
 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994), 3.  
27
 Smith (1998), 146. 
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emergence of the modern nation-states. The high culture then has had “certain kind of 
literate which could only be forged and sustained by exo-socialisation.” Exo-socialisation 
was the idea that modern nation-states unlike the pre-modern societies have had a new 
kind of public education that had a standardized national curriculum. 
28
 
 This post-modernist explanation of nationalism is a departure from the classical and 
romantic assumption that a people could be a nation if they had a common language. 
Germany and France are, for instance, the two often examples that historians provide 
when they describe the relationship between nationhood and common language. The 
classical and romantic explanations of these two countries are that France and Germany 
achieved a sense of nationhood because Germans and French were able to unite 
themselves around a common language. For example, Labbe (2007) argues that the 
Prussian state in the nineteenth century tried to make a German nation by 
institutionalizing German language in schools and churches. The schools and churches 
were registering a person according to his or her mother tongue.
29
 However, the 
modernist and post-modernist theorists of nationalism do not share the views of the 
classic theorists of nationalism. Today many people share a common language, though 
they are not one nation. Americans and Brits speak, for example, English while they form 
two different nationalities.  
Because of the above discussed problems of the primordialism and perennialism 
theories of nationalism, and the comprehensiveness of a grand narrative and all-
                                                          
28
 Ibid, 29-41 
29
 See also Boyd C. Shafer’s Nationalism: Myth and Reality, (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& World, 1955). Shafer’s work is a classic explanation of nationalism that emphasizes the role of 
linguistic commonality in the creation of nations. Shafer, for example, argues that France and 
Germany were able to becoming nations because each had a common language.  
13 
 
 
 
encompassing analysis of the modernist and post-modernist approach, this thesis has 
found no data or evidence to prove that the modern nation of Afghanistan has always 
existed in the past, and or it was given in nature. Therefore, applying the post-modernist 
theories of nationalism, this thesis does not assume that there was always a country, 
“Afghanistan,” in the history. In fact, Afghanistan as it is now known has been a modern 
polity that was constructed by colonialism in the long nineteen century, 1808-1919.  Only 
after 1901 did an identity in the modern sense of the word such as “Afghan” began to be 
imagined.
 
This was as a result of several sociopolitical developments such as the 
establishment of a new kind of education and emergence of a small roshanfekran or the 
elite class in Kabul. For example, in 1923 when the Afghan nationalists designed the 
country’s first national constitution, they homogenized the diverse ethnic identity in the 
country where they now emphasized a homogenous national identity as “Afghan” over 
ethnic identities such as “Pashtun” or “Tajik” or “Sunni” or “Shia” and or “Hindu.” 
Everybody who was residing in Afghanistan was “imagined” as Afghan without regards 
to their religious beliefs and affiliations and ethnic identities 
30
    
In here, the concept of “imagined” is used from Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities (1991). Anderson suggests that nationalism is imagined because nationals 
of a country, whether representing a big or a small nation, will never know or meet or 
hear each other. What this mean is that it would be impossible for a national of a country, 
say an Afghan, to know or meet every single countryman or countrywoman in his or her 
nation, though they would still imagine a shared community, the nation. In addition to the 
                                                          
30
 Government of Afghanistan (1923), 5  
14 
 
 
 
imagination of nationalism, Anderson suggests that nationalism is “limited” because 
there are several competing nationalisms in the world such as nationalism in Afghanistan 
and nationalism in Iran or nationalism in India and nationalism in China. Therefore, 
according to Anderson, nationalism is inherently limited to a particular nation. Last but 
not least, Anderson also suggests that nationalism is “sovereign” because its creation is 
new in the human history. It originated when the nation-states and the tools of the high 
culture such as “print-capitalism” or newspapers and public spaces began to appear, 
which then replaced previous forms of legitimacy and loyalty such as the divine-authority 
and or the church.
31
 In Afghanistan too, individuals such as emir Amanullah Khan and 
the Afghan nationalists such as Mahmud Tarzi (1865-1933), Mir Ghulam M. Ghobar, 
Ghulam Muhyiuddin Anis (died, 1938), and Abdul Hai Habibi (1910-1984) “imagined” a 
nation of Afghanistan and propagated it in the early twentieth century.  
To conceptualize this imagination and propagation of a national idea and nationhood, 
the four chapters below will address the following queries: how the modern nation of 
Afghanistan came about; where to locate the origins of nationalism in Afghanistan; who 
played significant roles in its creation; and how did the Afghan nationalists imagine 
Afghan nation in the period between 1901 and 1929. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, (New York: Verso, 1991), 6-7. 
 
  
Chapter One: Colonialism and Nationalism in Afghanistan 
 We are at a point in our work when we can no longer ignore empires and the 
imperial context in our studies.  
Edward Said, 1993
32
 
 
The Origins of Nationalism in Afghanistan: Empire, Colonial Knowledge 
What brought about the modern nation of Afghanistan is not a selective question 
because it is a necessary and appropriate one if one wants to study nationalism in 
Afghanistan. Ernest Renan (1823-1892), the French writer, titled his widely renowned 
essay with a question, “What is a Nation?” His answer was that the modern nation is a 
“historical result that is brought about by a series of convergent facts.” Its creation is 
sometime the work of particular individuals, sometime due to the existence of a direct 
will among its creators, and sometime because of the formation of a general 
consciousness of its participants.
33
 The origins of the modern nation of Afghanistan also 
involve a series of convergent facts, which are to be found in the annals of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century Afghanistan.  
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries are crucial periods for studies of nationalism, 
especially for nationalisms of the colonized societies. These two centuries witnessed the 
rise and fall of the great multinational states. Empires were built and ruined by 
nationalisms; the French, British, German, Japanese, Russian, and others including the 
imperial and un-imperial nations of Americas. New nations were founded and 
disintegrated by local and global nationalisms. Because nationalism became also a 
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fanciest and racist ideology, and produced atrocities, it was soon to be condemned by 
serious academic works and individuals later in the twentieth century due to its flaws and 
violent as well as authoritarian character and history. It was for these flaws that some 
have characterized nationalism as defining an invented phenomenon and an imagined 
community. Such observations are notwithstanding, nationalism still remains a popular 
topic that attracts the attention of scholars who seek to examine the role that nationalism 
had played in the making and unmaking of empires and nations in these two centuries.
34
 
Take for example the role that the British Empire or British nationalism played in its 
confrontation with several nationalisms in the world during and after nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. These crucial incidents continue to play a role in the national 
memories of various communities who experienced them. They happened from the 
valleys, mountains, plains, and passes of Bamian, Charikar, Kabul, and Jalalabad in 
Afghanistan to the plains of Punjab and shores of Persia as well as East Africa, South 
Africa, West Africa, Jamaica, and China. For example, some of these incidents were but 
not limited to the  First Anglo-Ashanti War1823-1831; Opium Wars in China 1839-42; 
First Anglo-Afghan War1838-1842; Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-1880; Third 
Anglo-Afghan War, 1919; 1840s wars against South African “Kaffirs”; New Zealand 
Maoris War; Conquest of Punjab; the Crimean War 1854-6; Conquest of lower Burma 
1854;  Second China War 1856-60; Anglo-Persian War 1857; Suppression of Indian 
Mutiny 1857; Governor Eyre Suppression of the Morant Bay Rebellion 1865;  Decisive 
Campaign against Ashantis 1874; Conquest of Egypt 1882; Partition of India and 
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Palestine 1947; and creation of nations of Ghana and Kenya 1957 and 1963. As it seems 
here, it is only a partial group of incidents that the British Empire had with various 
nationalities and nations of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
35
  
Noting, therefore, the involvement and impact of empire and colonial activities on 
creation and suppression of nationalisms in the world during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century,  it will become clear to notice how colonialism laid the very foundation of 
nationalism in Afghanistan from 1808 to 1919. The imperial colonial activities of the 
nineteenth century, both by the British and Russia, created the foundation of nationalism 
in Afghanistan. These activities took several forms. They were in the forms of colonial 
diplomatic treaties, overt and covert colonial missions, colonial conferences, colonial 
wars, and colonial writings. They defined and territorialized the very name “Afghan” and 
the territory that is now known as Afghanistan. All of them helped to construct the 
colonial imagination and identification of Afghans as a wild tribal people and mapped 
Afghanistan’s modern territorial boundaries.  Take for example the following survey of 
colonial activities in and about Afghanistan during the nineteenth century: Afghanistan’s 
ten enthroned rulers of this period receive or allow entering into Afghanistan twelve 
overtly known colonial diplomatic, spying, and commercial emissary missions.
36
 The 
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purpose of each mission was to collect and produce information about Afghans as a 
people and their territory as a polity, and bind them to the colonial conventions of 
friendship, alliance, obligation, and do-business. These widely known missions were 
Mountstuart Elphinstone Mission to the Kingdom of Caubul, 1808-1809; Alexander 
Burns First Mission, 1831-4; Alexander Burns Second Mission to the Court of Dost 
Mohammad Khan, Kabul 1837; Russian Mission to the Court of Dost Mohammad Khan, 
1837; Alexander Burns Third Mission with the Army of Indus to Afghanistan, 1838-
1841; Goldsmid Mission 1870-72; The Ottoman Mission to Afghanistan, 1877; Russian 
Mission to Kabul, 1878;  Sir Neville F. F. Chamberlain British Mission to the Court of 
Shir Ali Khan, 1878; Sir Peter Lumsden Mission to Herat 1884; Dane Mission 1905; and 
German-Ottoman Mission 1915.  As a result of these twelve known and widely accepted 
colonial missions between the years 1808 and 1915, Afghanistan was placed practically 
and systemically in the orbits of the nineteenth century imperial-colonial apparatuses 
where the people and its territories were literally defined and imagined by the colonial 
officials who wrote about and characterized the history of Afghanistan, the culture of 
Afghanistan, and the territory of Afghanistan. They wrote who an Afghan was and was 
not. They decided where Afghanistan’s boundaries could and could not be. For instance, 
Elphinstone in his An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul established the very parameter 
of Afghanistan. He designated that “Afghaunistaun” was the area that was inhabited by 
the Pashtuns and Pashtuns were the real Afghans, and their kingdom was “the kingdom 
of Caubul.” He instead designated places and other ethnic groups such as “Bulkh” or 
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Balkh or “Uzbeks” as “dependencies” of Afghanistan not part of Afghanistan and 
Afghans.
37
  
In addition to the twelve overtly known colonial missions to Afghanistan, 
Afghanistan’s ten enthroned rulers sign nearly thirteen binding treaties with colonial 
powers, mainly with the British Empire and or its patronized commercial enterprise, the 
British East India Company. The treaties, which determined the fate of boundaries of 
Afghanistan, its political sovereignty, and commercial flows of goods and services, made 
Afghanistan a client state of the colonial powers.
38
 
 Beside the twelve colonial missions, thirteen Afghan-Colonial Powers Treaties, and 
five inter-colonial powers treaties, Afghanistan’s rulers or its emissaries attended and or 
were uninvited to five major colonial diplomatic conferences that were held to address 
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the political and territorial status of Afghanistan in the second half of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. The conferences were the Anglo-Russian Negotiations of 1869-
1873, Ambala Conference of 1872, Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Mussoorie 
Conference of 1920, and Kabul Conference of 1921.  
The Russo-Anglo negotiations of the late nineteenth century on Afghanistan was of 
particular interest here as an intercontinental negotiations that the European imperial 
powers had in order to address the so-called “Eastern Question.” Ottoman Empire was in 
decline and to protect and expand their imperial interests in the Ottoman held dominions 
such as in Egypt and in the Balkans and Asia Minor, the imperial powers of Europe had 
to enter into some sort of negotiations in order to prevent a total intercontinental war. For 
example, Russia was already gaining new territories and influences in the Balkans, 
Caucasus, and Central Asia. In 1873, the Khanate of Khiva, to the north of Afghanistan, 
was captured by the Russians; five years later in 1878, this Russian advance in Central 
Asia triggered the British to instigate a second invasion of Afghanistan, known as the 
Second Anglo-Afghan War. To protect India, British entered into negotiations with the 
Russia. Although the negotiations of 1869-1873 failed to stop Russia from expanding its 
imperial holdings in Central Asia, the negotiations resulted in assurances from the 
Russians to the British—not to the Afghans—that both imperial powers will recognize 
the British interest and “sphere of influence” in and over Afghanistan. In addition, 
Imperial Russia agreed with the British that they would recognize the Afghan emir Shir 
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Ali Khan’s claims over Afghanistan’s northern and northeastern boundaries.39 Like the 
first major colonial conference of 1869-1873 where Afghanistan was mapped to become 
a “nation,” the other four colonial conferences of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century completed the construction of modern nation of Afghanistan, at least territorially.  
The impact of the twelve colonial missions to Afghanistan, the thirteen Afghan-
Colonial powers treaties, five inter-colonial powers treaties, and five major colonial and 
inter-colonial conferences on the Afghan nation is obvious. Each of these colonial 
missions, colonial treaties, colonial conferences, and colonial wars had everlasting impact 
on nationalism in Afghanistan.  While the very foundation of the idea of an Afghan 
nation was constructed by these colonial activities, Afghan nationalists took it for granted 
and made it into something local and un-colonial. The Afghan nationalists denied this 
very historic reality that Afghanistan was a colonial construct. Afghan nationalists have 
rejected the argument that colonialism was the maker of modern Afghan nation because 
for them Afghanistan existed as a nation before the colonial era. This Afghanistan was, 
for them, in reality a tarikhi-e Afghanistan or the ancient Afghanistan.  
To analyze critically and understand better this transformation of nationalism in 
Afghanistan from a colonial concept into a local idea, one of the twelve colonial 
missions—the Mountstuart Elphinstone Mission to the Kingdom of Caubul 1808-1809—
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will be examined thoroughly here to shed light on the role and power of colonial 
knowledge in construction of nationalism in Afghanistan
40
 
Mountstuart Elphinstone: Baba-ye Afghan, the Father of Afghans Invented 
 
Mountstuart Elphinstone (1779-1859), the Scottish-born colonial official of the 
British East India Company, has continuously remained the main architect and the high 
authority of Afghan knowledge since 1815 when his book An Account of the Kingdom of 
Caubul was first published.
41
 Elphinstone is important not only because he was the first 
European colonial official to visit an Afghan ruler, Shah Shuja (r. 1803-1810, 1839-1842) 
and secured an eternal friendship treaty from him to the British Empire. He also 
organized, simplified, and standardized what is now known of Afghans, as a people, and 
Afghanistan, as a country.
42
 To critically understand Elphinstone’s role in the 
construction of colonial imagination of Afghans and assess how much intellectually 
important he was in establishing the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan, it is 
necessary to analyze his An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul rather his mission to the 
court of Afghan ruler.  
Although Elphinstone was the first colonial official who visited an Afghan ruler and 
secured from him the first pact that an Afghan monarch signed with a European colonial 
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power, the British East India Company, he was not the first colonial official to establish 
correspondences with Afghans’ rulers, and write about Afghans. The first written 
colonial contacts took place between the British colonial state in India and Ahmad Shah 
Abdali/Durrani (r. 1747-1773), the so-called baba-ye Afghan or the father of Afghans 
during the years 1760-1761.  In the pre-Elphinstone colonial contacts with Afghans, 
Henry Vansittart, a colonial officer of the British East India Company, and Sir William 
Jones (the famous orientalist and founder of the Asiatic Society of Bengal who also 
authored the theory of the Indo-European Language Family), were instrumental in 
producing the early colonial imagination of Afghans.
43
 Vansittart and Jones both studied 
and commented on history and genealogy of Afghans. For example, they examined 
philologically Pashto language, one of the major languages of Afghans, in relation to the 
other Indo-European languages.  
They made two major inventions about Afghans that later played important role on 
nationalism in Afghanistan and resonate even today with the public and official minds 
both inside and outside Afghanistan. One invention, which later captured the attention 
and entered into the writings of several colonial officials, was that the Afghans were one 
of the ten lost tribes of Israel. Although the Jewish Descent Theory of Afghans did not 
receive much support from the Afghan nationalists, it became part of the Afghan and 
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outsider’s minds, at least.44 However, it was the second colonial invention that Jones 
made of and for Afghans, which later impressed Afghan nationalists who took it as fact 
and adopted it locally and propagated it in the official and un-official institutions of the 
state power. This was the view that Afghans were Aryans and Afghanistan was the real 
main homeland of Aryans, who then spread across the world.
45
 These pre-Elphinstone 
colonial imaginations of Afghans are important but they did not carry substantial and 
widespread consequences.  
 It is Elphinstone’s An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul that most fully structured 
the colonial imagination of Afghans—an imagination that Afghan nationalists re-
documented and re-enshrined in the idea of Afghanistan.
46
 The most important thing that 
Elphinstone did was that he defined “Afghans” and Afghanistan.47 In other words, he 
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explained who Afghans were and were not. His account is full of descriptions of 
Afghans’ characteristics, religion, society, culture, politics, and so on. He also discussed 
the Afghan government, provinces, mountains, and anything else colonial officials 
needed to know about the people of Afghanistan and their homeland. He even labeled the 
tribes and categorized them. For instance, he differentiated between the tribes with 
territorial boundaries and the tribes without. “Naussers” were introduced as a tribe that 
had no territories like “Eusofzyes,” and they had a “wandering life.”48 
Although everything that Elphinstone documented in his Account of the Kingdom of 
Caubul about Afghans has in one or another way a place in understanding nationalism in 
Afghanistan, his characterization of Afghans as a people will shed light here about how 
much significant his impact was on the very knowledge that people now have of Afghans 
and Afghanistan. He characterizes individually and collectively all of the various peoples 
of the country.  But, what becomes interesting and questionable is how he takes samples 
and characterizes Afghans. For instance, he writes that he was characterizing “all of the 
manner and characters of Afghauns,” by describing the characters of the “Eastern 
tribes—the Berdooraunees,” and from among them, “Eusofzyes” who “display many of 
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the peculiarities of their nation in more perfection than any other tribe.”  “In 
consequence,” Elphinstone continues, “we find the Berdooraunees brave, but 
quarrelsome; active, industrious, and acute, but selfish, contentious, and dishonest. They 
are more bigoted and intolerant than the other Afghauns, and more under the influence of 
their Moollahs. They are also more vicious and debauched, and some among them are, in 
all respects, the worst of the Afghauns.”49  
These contrasting images of Afghans as people who were “brave, but quarrelsome; 
active, industrious, and acute, but selfish, contentious, and dishonest,” drawn by the 
power of colonial ink, continued in the official and public minds of both foreigners and 
Afghans since Elphinstone published his An Account of the Kingdom of Kabul. For 
example, Lowell Thomas, the American journalist who amazed the public and official 
minds in imperial metropolises after World War One by photographing T. E. Lawrence 
and transforming an ordinary British Colonial Army officer into a “Lawrence of Arabia,” 
went to Afghanistan in 1920s. He continued in the style of Elphinstone by publishing an 
account in which he exoticized Afghanistan and Afghans.  In his Beyond Khyber Pass 
into Forbidden Afghanistan (1925), he paraphrased Elphinstone’s characterization of 
Afghans: 
The Afridis, and in fact all Afghan-Pathan peoples, abhor stupidity, 
indecision, and hair-splitting (except in theological controversy) and will follow 
only a leader with courage and dash. Warm-hearted to those they love; they are 
brutally cruel to their enemies. Impulsive to a fault, they will wait patiently for 
years in order to get revenge. They are hospital, yet canny, and excessively 
conceited, but feel a humble resignation to the will of Allah. They have also the 
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germ of that spirit of travel and adventure that has made every great nation and is 
the hope of the world. 
50
 
 
Reading Lowell Thomas’s account and the narratives of other writers, both Afghans 
and foreigners, one immediately recognizes the impact of Mountstuart Elphinstone 
Mission (1808-1809) and his book An Account of the Kingdom of Kabul. It structured the 
foundation of what now is known of Afghanistan. Elphinstone’s impact is nicely 
summarized by one study as the following:  
“Elphinstone’s conceptual episteme did not simply frame subsequent understandings 
of Afghan society as tribal. It also narrowed ideas of what constitutes legitimate political 
order and community in Afghanistan. This narrowing exerted a formative effect over 
both colonial policy and colonial knowledge, and it continues to influence international 
efforts in Afghanistan today. Once the space occupied by the Afghans had been cognized 
in terms of the Elphinstone episteme, the colonial state began to contour that space with 
political expectations. Having constructed the Afghan political entity as essentially South 
Asian in character, the Company, and later the Crown, expected the Afghans to act like 
other political entities with which they interacted in the subcontinent.” 51  
 
As Elphinstone showed that empire and colonial knowledge had something to do with 
nationalism in Afghanistan, it was not only Elphinstone as a colonial official who defined 
and characterized Afghans and their homeland, Afghanistan. It was “a series of the 
convergent facts” as Ernest Renan indicated that could result in creation of a nation. This 
was true of nationalism in Afghanistan’s colonial legacy, which had these series of 
convergent facts in its trajectory.  
Indeed, when Elphinstone was traveling through the plains and valleys of northern 
India all the way up to Peshawar looking for and after Afghans to ‘record’ for the British 
colonial state in India in 1808, one of his Scottish fellowman, William Blackwood (1776-
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1834), founded Edinburgh Encyclopedia in the same year to record Edinburgh, the capital 
of the “Scottish Nation.”52 Late in the nineteenth century, exactly sixty-four years after 
the first publication of An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, another Scottish colonial 
officer, Major George Frederick Blackwood who was the grandson of William 
Blackwood came to Kandahar, the capital of southern Afghanistan. Blackwood was badly 
sick in 1879 when he heard that Sir Pierre Louis Cavagnari, the Italian-French born and a 
British naturalized citizen and colonial officer had been killed in his Colonial Residency 
in Kabul in September 3
rd
, 1879.   
Although Major Blackwood was still sick in India, he could not accept the possibility 
that the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880) might become another lost battle for the 
British Empire similar to the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842). Consequently, Major 
Blackwood left India to Afghanistan to avenge the killing of Cavagnari, the British 
Envoy in Kabul. When he arrived in Kandahar, he was one of the several colonial 
officers to assist Abdur Rahman Khan (r. 1880-1901), the celebrated “Iron Amir,” the 
state-builder, and unifier of the modern nation of Afghan nation and a British subsidized 
ruler. Major Blackwood wanted to keep in power Rahman’s appointed governor, Wali 
Shir Ali Khan in Kandahar, and take revenge of the killing of Cavagnari. However, in 
July 27 of 1880 Major Blackwood was also killed in the Battle of Maiwand, the most 
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memorable battle that Afghan nationalists would recall from their experiences with the 
British colonialism in Afghanistan. 
53
 
As Elphinstone established the Afghan figure “Ahmed Shauh,” the founder of 
Afghanistan,
54
 so did Major George Frederick Blackwood death in the Battle of Maiwand 
in turn create another Afghan figure, Malalai—this time the female Afghan figure of 
nationalism in Afghanistan. As part of the colonial-nationalism narrative in Afghanistan, 
the story goes that Malali, who is locally known as da Maiwand Malalai or Malalai of 
Maiwand, along with her father and fiancé participated in the Battle of Maiwand, which 
occurred during her wedding day. She was then martyred in the battle. In the annals of 
the battle when it was turning in favor of the British, it has been written that Malalai 
shouted: 
 "Young love! If you do not fall in the battle of Maiwand, by God, 
someone is saving you as a symbol of shame!" 
 "With a drop of my sweetheart's blood, shed in defense of the 
Motherland, Will I put a beauty spot on my forehead, such as would put to 
shame the rose in the garden."
55
 
 
 This call, the story goes, from an “Afghan woman” upon the Afghan men who were 
supposedly losing the Battle of Maiwand to the British turns the battle in favor of Afghan 
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and results in a victory for Afghanistan. Malalai, who is the heroine of the Battle of 
Maiwand, provided nationalism in Afghanistan with the imagined, real, and mythical 
realities that all nationalisms need to foster a sense of nationhood. Since Malalai’s 
participation in the Battle of Maiwand and identification of her as a female figure of 
nationalism in Afghanistan have become part of the popular and local narrative in the 
country, she is now honored throughout Afghanistan by naming after her Malalai High 
School, Malalai Hospital, and Malalai Magazine. In addition to these institutions, 
thousands Afghan parents have named (and continue to name)
 56
 their daughters as 
“Malalai” after Malalai of Maiwand.  
The end of the Battle of Maiwand and the construction of Malalai as Afghanistan’s 
nationalist icon commenced the twentieth century. By this time, Elphinstone’s An 
Account of the Kingdom of Caubul was already more useful and more necessary than ever 
for Afghan nationalists. They were ready to use any sources, no matter Elphinstonian 
knowledge and or its locally adopted and modified forms to imagine Afghanistan. 
Exactly one hundred eighteen years after Elphinstone published his An Account of the 
Kingdom of Caubul where he designated ‘Ahmed Shauh’ the founder of modern 
Afghanistan, Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, one of the prominent Afghan nationalists 
of the era agreed with Elphinstone’s designation of Ahmad Shah as the founder of 
Afghanistan. However, what Ghobar did different from Elphinstone was that he did not 
only designate Ahmad Shah as the founder of modern Afghanistan, but he also 
designated him as Ahmad Shah Baba-ye Afghan or Ahmad Shah the Father of Afghans.   
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 It is useful to note here that the current internationally and U.S backed-president of 
Afghanistan Hamid Karzai named Malalai his second child, a daughter, who was recently born in 
March 15, 2012.  
  
Chapter Two, Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan 
In addition to the theoretical and contextual problems associated with the study of 
nationalism in Afghanistan, there is also the issue of scarcity of scholarship on the 
subject. The associated problem is the fact that the Euro-American scholars of the 
country have not demonstrated dissimilarity in their approach and argument.  There is no 
difference of opinion about and of nationalism in Afghanistan among them. They have 
collectively identified the tenets of nationalism in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929 in 
a hegemonic way and they have labeled this period as an era of “reform and rebellion” in 
Afghanistan. Considering the number of studies that are produced about nationalism in 
Afghanistan and their hegemonic treatment of nationalism in Afghanistan through one 
kind of narrative, one kind of tale, and one kind of description, it is safe here to review 
them also monolithically rather than individually.
57
  
In here, the review of studies of nationalism in Afghanistan introduces certain 
personalities of nationalism, certain events of nationalism, and the general characteristic 
of nationalism in Afghanistan. The metaphor that would guide the discussion in this 
chapter is called “A Hegemonic Narrative of Nationalism in Afghanistan.” This narrative 
is woven around individual nationalists and their time: 
Habibullah Khan, r. 1901-1919 
The narrative, which the previous studies have told of nationalism in Afghanistan, 
starts with “great men” and “hegemonic institutions” such as Emir Habibullah Khan (r. 
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1901-1919) and Habibya College.
58
 Although Habibullah Khan or Siraj al-Millat wa’Din, 
the Torch of Nation and Religion, was born in Samarqand (then a colonized Central 
Asian Khanate of the Russian Empire where his father Abdur Rahman was living), he as 
the Crown Prince of Afghanistan inherited the throne in 1901 when Rahman died. His 
father, who ruled Afghanistan with coercion and cruelty for twenty one years, 1880-1901, 
left for him a colonially established state with a territorially unified polity. As he began 
his rule, the British Colonial State in India also continued bankrolling him, as the heir of 
the Afghan throne. This patronage was in recognition of the fact that his father, Rahman, 
was the signatory of several treaties with the British. The British continued to grant 
subsidy in return for recognizing British to control and protect Afghanistan’s foreign 
relations.
59
 
However, what becomes important to the development of nationalism in Afghanistan, 
as the narrative tells, is that Habibullah was different from his father. This difference was 
seen in many actions and activities of Habibullah while he ruled Afghanistan. He was a 
man of modern ideas and modern ways of running a state and a country. He was, as one 
study of nationalism in Afghanistan wrote, a person with an “enterprising nature … 
[and]…curious about technology and mechanics.”60 For instance, he was not shy to be 
photographed; a new fashion of identification that became more popular among the elites 
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 May Schinasi, Afghanistan at the beginning of the twentieth century: nationalism and 
journalism in Afghanistan: a study of Seraj ul-akhbar, 1911-1918), (Naples: Istituto universitario 
orientale (1979), 29. However, it is important to note here that Habibullah’s father, Rahman, was 
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of Kabul in the early twentieth century.
61
 He also did not hesitate to introduce for the first 
time motor cars (see the figure below) in Afghanistan. He even went to India to join 
secretly a British Colonial Freemasonry in Calcutta, Lodge Concordia No. 3102; a 
colonial club “with a small but exclusive membership, restricted to British Civil and 
Military Officers of high standing.”62 
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(Figure, 3) 
 
The Perisan text beneath the image reads as following: “The car, which is the personal vehical of His 
Majesty, Siraj ul’Millat Wa Din, is the best car among the Royal House’s cars. Engine 40 to 50 Power. 
Speed, 60 Miles Per Hour.”63 
 
However, what really made Habibullah different from his father, more so than the 
introduction of motor cars and membership of the colonial freemasonry in India, was his 
decision to offer political amnesty to the thousands Afghans who had been exiled by his 
father. This amnesty, as conveyed by the hegemonic narrative of nationalism in 
Afghanistan, made possible for Afghanistan to start experiencing modernization reforms 
because of the return of the exiled Afghans. Since the exiled Afghans had spent times in 
places such as Damascus, Cairo, Istanbul, and colonial cities of British India, they were 
well aware with reforms and modernization efforts of the governments and nationalists in 
those places. When Habibullah invited them to come to Afghanistan, they came back. But 
when the exiled Afghans, chief among them Mahmud Tarzi’s family arrived and saw the 
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backwardness of their fatherland, they raised questions about Afghanistan’s past 
historical achievements in the Perso-Islamic world, its present-status of backwardness, 
and raised questions about the solutions for its future: Chea bodeam (what were we); 
Chea shodeam (what we became); and Aya Che Bayed Kard, (what ought to be done)?
64
 
Aya Che Bayed Kard was the Persian title of a book (1912) that was written by Mahmud 
Tarzi the so-called “father” of nationalism in Afghanistan.  
Tarzi (1865-1933) was one of the exiled Afghans who returned to Afghanistan when 
Habibullah issued the amnesty.
65
 Aya Che Bayed Kard is praised by the previous studies 
of nationalism in Afghanistan because it shows the development of national 
consciousness in Afghanistan and the attempts of Afghan nationalists to reforming the 
country. Aya Che Bayed Kard’s main (and hegemonic) argument is that the advancement 
of a country depends how much loyal the people of that country are to the ruler and the 
state, and how much the ruler favors his people. According to Tarzi, it was possible for 
Afghanistan to progress. However, there were certain ways to achieve progress in 
Afghanistan. “To progress,” Tarzi suggests a hegemonic premise:  
One way is that the ruler should favor reforms for [his] country, especially the rulers 
of the Abode of Islam because a Muslim sees necessary the existence of a ruler. And he 
obeys him, and sanctions himself in service of the ruler…..We [Afghans] are thankful for 
the Almighty God who has favored the Afghan nation with a just ruler, Habibullah, Siraj 
ul-Millat Wa Din. Another way to advancement and progress of a nation is through 
education, which has been made possible by the Holiness, the Necessary Being, 
Habibullah. 
66
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The exiled Afghans such as Tarzi, whose local and global modernist consciousness 
was the result of their immigration, access to information, and interaction in the wider 
world outside Afghanistan, became nationalist Afghans once they came back to their 
fatherland. The hegemonic narrative of nationalism in Afghanistan tells that it were these 
nationalist Afghans who began to help Habibullah to bring about a number of 
modernization reforms in Afghanistan. For example, Habibya College, a modern school 
with a new standard curriculum of education besides the religious education, was opened 
in 1904.
67
 In 1911, the Afghan nationalists now led by Tarzi published Siraj ul-Akhbar 
Afghaniya, “the Torch of Afghan News.” Publication of Siraj ul-Akhbar, as the first 
modern newspaper in Afghanistan, promoted a nationalistic and modernist idea whose 
writers and readers were Afghan elites in Afghanistan and pan-Islamic and pan-Asian 
nationalists outside Afghanistan.
68
 
 However, before Siraj al-Akhbar, Afghanistan had also a newspaper that was called 
Shams Al’Nahar or “the Sun of the Day” that was published supposedly between 1873 
and 1877. Unlike Siraj Al-Akhbar, very little is known of Shams Al’Nahar—answers to 
such basic questions as whose idea was it and where the printing presses were brought 
from, and why it stopped publishing all elude the researcher. The current knowledge 
about Shams Al-Nahar is all based on the 16 page copy that exists: its editor was Mirza 
Abdul Ali who worked in the court of emir Shir Ali Khan. It was published in Persian. 
Internal evidence from the available 16 pages of Shams al’Nahar indicates that its 
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sources of information were mostly newspapers of South Asia origins.  The scripts would 
be copied and reported. Some of the South Asian newspapers’ names that appear in 
Shams al’Nahar are “Newspapers of Rajputana,” “Newspapers of Moradabad,” 
“Newspapers of Lahore,” and “Newspapers of Punjab.”69 The world news appeared first 
in the bulletin and the domestic news came in second. Some of the news reports were on 
such topics as “an English man who divorces his old wife after meeting a girl, and 
promises her marriage. However, after a while he does not marry her but remarries his 
old wife. This creates a bad name for the girl. Now the courts have asked him to pay a 
fine of 30,000 rupees to the father of the girl so that he can marry his daughter to 
somebody else.”70 Some of the news headlines were reports Khabar az London or News 
from London and News from America: the New World, which included stories about the 
railway construction programs that were being undertaken in the United States. Other 
news reports were on topics like new ways to know a child: “it has been reported from 
China where they have found out a new way to know about legitimacy of a son. They 
take some blood from a son, and some from a father, and put them in a cup or bowel. If 
the bloods mix, it means that the son is the legitimate son of the father. Otherwise, if the 
bloods don’t mix, there was no relationship between them.”71  
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Although Shams al-Nahar was the first known newspaper of Afghanistan in the 
nineteenth century and Siraj al-Akhbar started its publication in 1911, Afghanistan began 
to have a growing culture of print-capitalism after the country was made independent in 
1919. In the years after 1919, the Afghan nationalists or roshanfekran or the elites as they 
were known and referred to themselves locally, had access to foreign magazines and 
newspapers as well as several other domestic publications. For example, unlike the period 
1901 until 1918 when there was only Siraj al-Akhbar, in the period between 1919 and 
1929 there were at least thirteen major newspapers in the country. Every one of these 
newspapers represented a region of the country: Southern, Eastern, Northern, Western, 
and Central Afghanistan including the capital, Kabul. For example, Etehad-e Mashriqi, 
‘eastern unity’ (1920), represented the eastern provinces of Afghanistan. In 1922, Etehad-
e Khan Abad, ‘Khan Abad unity,’ was founded, representing northeastern region, 
Qataghan Province. Bedari, ‘awakening,’ and Etehad-e Islami, ‘Islamic unity’ were 
founded in the city of Mazar-e- Sharif in the northern region. Setar-e Afghan, ‘Afghan 
star,’ was established in Charikar, the capital of Parwan Province in central Afghanistan. 
In 1921, Tulu-e Afghan, ‘the rise of Afghan,’ started its publication in Kandahar city, 
representing southern Afghanistan.
72
  
All of these printing-publications show that the Afghan nationalists had more and 
more access to new information such as the concepts of nationality or nationhood and 
modernity that were made possible by what Benedict Anderson called print-capitalism. 
Although Afghanistan’s printing-publications were not as many as its neighbor countries, 
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such as British India, the Afghan roshanfekran or the elite class still had access to various 
regional and global printing-publications that allowed them to read about new 
information that was not only divine or theological but also secular and modern. For 
example, Mir Ghulam Mohammad (1897-1978), who grew up and self-educated himself 
during this period, writes that the Afghan roshanfekran were having access to foreign and 
domestic publications that provided them with secular and modern information about the 
“political, social, and economic affairs” of the world.  
The roshanfekran class, according to Ghobar, composed of three kinds of people: the 
liberals, the young Afghans, and individual roshanfeker or elite. The first two groups 
were connected directly with the royal court where they were advocating for reforms 
within the state. However, the difference between the liberals and the young Afghans, the 
first two groups, was that the latter wanted to change the absolute monarchial regime into 
a constitutionalist monarchy. The third group of roshanfekran who were outside the state 
had independent personal relationships among themselves such as sharing information 
about the state of affairs of Afghanistan and the world.
73
 What becomes interesting here 
is to note that these small groups of elites had increasing access to print-publications from 
both outside and inside Afghanistan, which was made possible by Afghanistan’s growing 
and regional print-capitalism market. 
During Habibullah Khan’s reign, the major printing source of information was Siraj 
Al-Akbar, the main publication of Afghanistan that advocated a nationalistic and 
modernist idea in Afghanistan. In this publication, the exiled Afghans including Mahmud 
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Tarzi who had returned to the country received strong support from Habibullah. He 
patronized the newspaper and its editor, Tarzi, to publish on the sociopolitical state of 
affairs of Afghanistan and the world. 
 However, the printing-publications soon became a problem for Habibullah who felt 
threaten and thought that his monarchial power was challenged by the Afghan 
nationalists who demanded faster and more reforms and changes in Afghanistan. In a way 
nationalism gets entrenched with rising sentiments of the Afghan nationalists. It became 
so in the sense that the Afghan nationalists, unlike Habibullah, wanted faster and more 
changes in the state and status quo of Afghanistan. This was especially true for those who 
disagreed with the internal and external policies of Habibullah Khan and demanded a 
complete change, for example, in the Anglo-Afghan Relations. This group is popularly 
characterized by the local Afghan historians as Mashruta’khwahan or the 
constitutionalists.
 74
  
Habibullah therefore felt suspicious and threatened by the Afghan nationalists who 
were demanding faster and more changes in the state, its internal and foreign policy, and 
above all, in the status quo of the country. The status quo of the country was related 
particularly to Afghanistan’s foreign policy which was still controlled by the British. 
When Habibullah refused to agree with the call for change and thereby demoralized the 
ambitions of the emerging Afghan nationalists, he was assassinated in 1919 when he was 
at a seasonal hunting trip in Laghman in Eastern Afghanistan.
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41 
 
 
 
There are several arguments with regards to Habibullah’s assassination. There is a 
religious argument. There is the speculation that the Afghan religious elites, led by 
Nasrullah Khan, Habibullah Khan’s brother, sponsored his assassination because he kept 
Afghanistan neutral during World War One when the British were fighting the Islamic 
Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire. How much convincing this argument is will be hard to 
prove, though it is accepted and narrated by the major works on nationalism in 
Afghanistan.
 75
 Another is the nationalism argument that purports that he was 
assassinated by Afghan nationalists because he did not only stay neutral during World 
War One but because he was still receiving subsidy from the British in exchange for 
allowing them to control the foreign policies of Afghanistan.
76
 Whether Habibullah was 
assassinated because of his neutrality in World War One or because of his agreement to 
grant British control of Afghanistan’s foreign policies, the hegemonic narrative tells that 
though Habibullah was the pioneer of modernization reforms that paved the way for 
nationalism in Afghanistan, he was not too much nationalist. This is in the sense that he 
did not bring enough change in the status quo of Afghanistan from a British controlled 
backward polity to an independent modern polity.  
Amanullah Khan, r. 1919-1929
77
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The hegemonic narrative picks up its tale of nationalism in Afghanistan by telling that 
when Habibullah was killed in 1919, his son Amanullah Khan who may have played a 
role in assassination of his father came to the throne after a short power struggle between 
him and his uncle, Nasrullah Khan. What is useful to note here is that the hegemonic 
narrative exoticizes and romanticizes Amanullah’s nationalism more than ever. 
Amanullah is identified, for example, as the champion of nationalism in Afghanistan 
because he did not want to only reform Afghanistan but he wanted to do it faster and 
drastically. After his enthroning, Amanullah freed Afghanistan from British control in the 
1919 War of Independence or known also as the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The freedom 
and reforms of Afghanistan were inevitable when Amanullah was enthroned because he 
was someone, as one study of him wrote: 
[Whose] heart was bred with a burning flame of nationalism which was not to be 
found in the heart of any other Afghans. He saw the flatters of other lands, and he 
heard the soft arguments of many nationalities. He learnt how beneficial it would 
be for Afghanistan to link her fortunes with the Germans and the Turks. He was 
intent upon showing to the world that Afghanistan could not be regarded as the 
pathetic little ‘buffer-state’ towards which the Great Powers could show a 
benevolent tolerance.” 78 
 
 When Afghanistan was made free, he started to modernize it rapidly and drastically 
because he was “the true Afghan.” It is argued by the hegemonic narrative that: 
 He knew the country better than most. He knew he had the personality to lead, and 
to lead as far as dead. He had brain, and he was sea-green incorruptible. He was not 
smug. But he was arrogant. He was now in the position to set in motion the ideals which 
had born in his heart. In many moments of reverie, he thought of the backward condition 
of his people. Even the tenets of the religion which were taken for granted in his country, 
came up for review in his vigorous brain. The women, for instance; few dared to brave 
the wrath of Allah and the temporal disapproval of the mullahs by thinking freely about 
the purdah system.  Few questioned the right of men to imprison women all their lives in 
the enveloping clock of custom. But Amanullah did….Amanullah’s energy and ambitions 
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were entirely guided by good intentions. [He was someone] that nothing swerved him 
from his path of violent nationalism.
79
  
 
The above passage is from Ronald Wild, a Scottish reporter for the Daily Telegraph 
of London. Wild is the only person who has produced a useful and only biographical 
account of Amanullah, Amanullah: Ex-King of Afghanistan (1933). Wild, like many other 
Western journalists, was astonished to witness first-hand the modernist reforms of 
Amanullah. In 1928 he went to Kabul to observe the reforms in person because he 
wanted to know whether the media reports out of Afghanistan were true or an 
exaggeration of the modernization programs of Amanullah. Wild finds Afghanistan still a 
place “untouched by civilization… [where in its capital, Kabul]…all around were the 
noisy dramas of Eastern buying and selling. In the actual thoroughfare, donkeys, and 
mules and skeleton ponies struggled and bumped their way through. ‘Kabadar! Kabadar!’ 
yelled the men who tend them. ‘Make way, make way.’ And with a continued shouting 
for room, obeyed by none, the merchandise of the entire East would pass.”80 Despite of 
the backwardness of “this God-forsaken corner of a harsh and cruel land….[where]…the 
so-called evils of modernity had never penetrated, and might never penetrate,”  Wild’s 
account of Amanullah like many studies of Afghanistan still draws a hegemonic and 
romanticized picture of Amanullah, and praises him throughout his book for standing 
against and modernizing a “savage land.”81  
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Although Amanullah is praised for his radical nationalism sentiments, the hegemonic 
narrative concludes with the observation that Amanullah was ignorant and yet too radical 
for the modernization program for Afghanistan. He could not understand the 
conservatism and natural backwardness of his traditional society; therefore he failed in 
his nationalistic reforms of Afghanistan. His failures were because he had a country, 
Afghanistan, that was (and “is”) an inward-looking society that opposed progress and 
reforms, which the true Afghan, Amanullah, envisioned for it.  
According to the hegemonic narrative of nationalism in Afghanistan, Amanullah was 
overthrown and exiled in 1929 following an uprising against his modernist progressive 
reforms.  There are two historiographical arguments that the studies of Afghanistan offer 
in regards to the fall of Amanullah’s regime. One is the argument of the foreign scholars. 
They argue that since Amanullah was swift and extreme in his modernization and 
nationalism reforms, he failed because he could not understand the religiosity and 
inward-looking characteristic of Afghan society. However, another argument is the local 
Afghan nationalist-narrative which presents Amanullah as a modernist Afghan who 
wanted to modernize Afghanistan. However, it was not the Afghan people who dethroned 
him; it was rather the British Government in India/Britain that plotted against his 
regime.
82
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This is, as it was explained above, how one would understand nationalism in 
Afghanistan; like a tale that is told and is retold and retold. It all starts from Habibullah’s 
enthroning, his reforms, Habibya College, and Siraj Al-Akhbar to Habibullah’s 
assassination. The tale picks up again from Amanullah, his War of Independence against 
the British, and his radical reforms to his exile.  
The Problems of Studies of Nationalism in Afghanistan 
It is evident from the above hegemonic narrative that previous studies of nationalism 
in Afghanistan lack a theoretical analysis of the subject. It is like a folk tale. The entire 
narrative is about “great men” such as the “Iron emir,” Abdur Rahman Khan, the 
moderate emir, Habibullah Khan, the “true Afghan,” Amanullah Khan, and modernist 
Afghan, Mahmud Tarzi. This “great men” history has several weaknesses that are rooted 
in how these studies are done.  In fact, the theories of postcolonial studies, such as the 
subaltern, post-modernism, and hegemonic theories as useful analytical tools of 
postcolonial studies of nationalism, are absent of Afghan history. For instance, the 
subaltern theory could talk about the very ordinary people for whom the nationalists 
claimed equality and inclusiveness while in reality they were marginalized, used and 
abused. A useful collection of essays on the subject of nationalism and subaltern 
communities is The Forging of Nationhood (2003), edited by Gyanendra Pandey and 
Peter Geschiere. The essays offer a subaltern postcolonial view and critique of modernity 
and nationalism, which has been so far neglected by the previous studies of nationalism 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Independence of Amanullah (Kabul: Matb-e Bayhaqi, 2005). For a discussion of Amanullah’s 
reforms and his failures to modernize Afghanistan in the face of the so-called tribal and 
conservative society of Afghanistan, see Leon Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 
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in Afghanistan. Their argument is that nationalism as an idea that positions itself for 
justice and inclusion excludes many people in whose names the nationalists propagate 
their agenda. In Afghanistan, for example, it is not clear how ordinary people felt about 
the nationalist activities and the manner such actions influenced the Afghan state. Thus, 
previous studies of nationalism in Afghanistan do not explain whether or not the ordinary 
Afghans shared similar views about the Afghan state or the reforms about modernization 
that were central to the conversation. As it will be showed in chapter three (“Reforms in 
Education”), nationalism was an elite project in Afghanistan during the period 1901-
1929. 
The Afghans who propagated an Afghan national idea formed a small elite class in 
Kabul, the capital of the country, and other urban centers. In addition to the problem of 
elitism, the other serious problem which the studies of nationalism in Afghanistan 
encounter is the lack of definition of what constituted nationalism in Afghanistan during 
the period under study. In other words, these studies talk about the opening of new school 
and reform of the education system, in which new subjects such as history, geography, 
and chemistry were taught. However, it is not explained how the school was organized, 
what were the forms of order and disciplines by which the schools were regulated, what 
kind of “Afghan history” they taught in the school, and how the Afghan state used the 
hegemonic institutions of education to expand its power and control the populace.  
By focusing on the modernization reforms only, the previous studies of nationalism in 
Afghanistan neglected the very meaning of nationalism. As Breuilly states in the opening 
of his Nationalism and the State (1994), “nationalism is above and beyond all else, about 
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politics and that politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is principally about 
control of the state. The central task [for a nationalist or the state] is to relate nationalism 
to the objectives of obtaining and using state power.”83 By attending to question of 
power, class, and cultural institutions, this thesis will use subaltern and post-modernist 
theories to address its main question: how did the Afghan state and Afghan nationalists 
used modernist reforms in education to propagate a national idea for Afghanistan? 
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Chapter Three: Reforms in Education 
Few years ago [before 1919], you were unaware. In everywhere, you were to be 
identified in the name of others. Even when you were going to pilgrimage to 
Mecca, you were traveling as Iranians and Turks because you did not have 
Afghan Passport and Tazkara.
84
 Now [since 1919] that you have an independent 
[country, Afghanistan], I wish you freedom until the Resurrection…Therefore; 
you must get passport and Tazkara. I have been informed that you have said; if 
you have gotten a passport or if you get one, you will be enlisted in the army and 
etc. This is not true. Don’t perceive bad the benefits of having Tazkara and 
passport. 85 
 
A limited but important number of studies have already engaged the topic of 
modernization reforms in Afghanistan. However, the study of nationalism in Afghanistan 
and reforms is incomplete and problematic. The attempt is here to re-examine critically 
nationalism in Afghanistan in the context of the reforms that occurred in educational 
system in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929.  Therefore, although the Afghan state 
implemented a number of reforms in the army, bureaucracy, laws, and education, the 
reforms in education will be assessed thoroughly here. The issue central to the discussion 
is education reform in Afghanistan as it was implemented from 1901 till 1929. Before a 
discussion of nationalism in Afghanistan and education is examined in this chapter, an 
explanation of the relationship between modernity and nationalism is offered in order to 
conceptualize the question of why the Afghan nationalists thought that the reforms in 
education were needed for Afghanistan.  
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Mumbai or as it was known during the British Raj as Bombay. Amanullah Khan gives a speech 
when he visits India as part of his grand tour of Europe and a number of other countries during 
the 1927-1928. His meeting with “Afghans of Bombay” was arranged by the Afghan Consulate 
and Afghans’ community there. His trip will be fully discussed in chapter four, “Symbolizing 
Afghanistan.” For the full text of the speech, see Aziz’ul-ddin Wakil Popalzai, Safarhay-e Ghazi 
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Conceptualizing Modernity 
The concept of modernity is not an unambiguous term.  First, there are terminological 
difficulties and ambiguities with the term.  Terms such as “pre-modern,” 
“modernity,”“postmodernism,” and “anti-modernism,” “Western,” or “Western 
modernity,” “Muslim modernity,” “Japanese modernity,” and “Turkish modernity” are 
conceptually vague constructs. Second, modernity does not have a clear temporal date. In 
other words, the periodization of modernity is a subjective selection. For example, in 
world history “modernity” can be located in and beyond the sociopolitical developments 
of industrial capitalism as Max Weber would argue. The Byzantine, Chinese and 
Islamicate modernities (Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires) of 1000-1900 A.D are 
famous examples. These empires were highly bureaucratic, sophisticated, and thus quite 
modern. Additionally, there is not an intellectual consensus on approaches of modernity 
too.
86
 
 In order to simplify the concept of modernity in this thesis, this chapter approaches 
modernity from the perspective of “reform nationalism.” Reform nationalism is the 
perspective that many non-European countries copied and adopted European social and 
political institutions such as national anthem or national army and or national education 
in order to claim national sovereignty, identity, and territoriality,  though they rejected the 
cultural superiority of the west. In this process of reforming, small classes of the local 
elites were the pioneers. Their desires and expectations to modernize their countries 
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 Two useful articles that describe the multiple “modernities,” and history of modernity 
are by Hefner Robert, “Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing 
Age,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 27 (1998), 83-104; and Peter V.D. Veer, “The Global 
History of Modernity,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 41, no. 3 
(1998), 285-94. 
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along the European lines were based on their experiences, observation, and knowledge 
that they have developed from living in, reading about, traveling to, and having 
connection and interaction with Europe and Europeans. Because of the Europe’s 
advanced military might, the local elites and their state invested locally to reform first the 
military. However, they then also began to reform other institutions of the state such as 
education system. 
87
  
In Afghanistan too, the Afghan nationalists used reform nationalism in propagating a 
sense of national identity, and they did it by imitating the European sociopolitical 
institutions.  Below, the Afghan nationalists’ reforms in education system are thoroughly 
explored with emphasis on making of a modern curriculum and the organization of the 
schools between 1904 and 1929.  
Mohammad Abid: The Indian Muslim Spy, Traveler, Teacher? 
Mohammad Adib, a Muslim Indian, arrives in “the holy land of Afghanistan” 
sometime between 1904 and December 15, 1916. While it is difficult to ascertain the 
exact date of his arrival, it is evident from the sources that Adib was subsequently invited 
to the Darul Sultana-e Kabul or the Royal Court of Kabul. Because he lacked knowledge 
of the Persian language, which was the state language, he “was not able to become aware 
and assess the real progress and changes in the educational improvement of this Islamic 
country.”  Although he spends his time in Kabul around and associated with state 
officials, he never articulated his reasoning for coming to Kabul.  It can be speculated 
that he was sent by the British Raj as a spy to produce a report of educational changes in 
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Afghanistan.  There was also the possibility that he came on an educational or political 
mission to Afghanistan on behalf of Muslims of India.  In fact, the first two decades of 
the 20
th
 century was a period of increased Indian Muslim contacts with Afghans.   
Politically, many Indian Muslims had embraced the idea of Pan-Islamism and had 
expressed concern about the fate of the Ottoman Empire as the seat of the Caliphate.  
Obviously such a position challenged to the colonial state in India. It will therefore also 
not be out of place to think that Mohammad Adib came to Afghanistan to help the 
Afghan nationalists to further reform their education.  On the professional level, he could 
have been contracted by the Afghan state to produce an assessment of the educational 
reforms in Afghanistan.  Lastly, it was also possible that Adib could have been one of the 
many Indian Muslim teachers hired in Afghanistan between 1904 and 1929 to teach at 
primary and secondary schools. The Indian Muslims connection with Afghan nationalists 
was important between 1904 and 1929. When Habibullah went to India in 1907, he 
established a Translation House in Calcutta where translators were paid to render new 
European scientific books into Persian for use at the newly built schools in Afghanistan.
88
 
This notwithstanding, these Indian teachers in Afghanistan could have served as British 
spies.
89
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 For a useful and informative article about Indian Muslims’ pan-Islamic and nationalism 
activities in Afghanistan, and how Islamic modernity including the Urdu Modernity and 
nationalism of South Asia has influenced the development of nationalism in Afghanistan, see Nile 
Green, “The Trans-border Traffic of Afghan Modernism: Afghanistan and the Indian 
‘Urdusphere,’” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 53, no. 53 (2011), 470-508.  
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 Specifically to Mohammad Adib, there is evidence of the specific duties he 
performed once he arrived in Kabul.  Mawlawi Abdul Rab Khan who was the Principal 
of Kabul Teacher Training Institute and also Head of Afghanistan’s Primary Schools 
officially invited Adib to observe and assess a students’ exam day in one of the primary 
schools in the city. Since Adib “was very interested in observing the schools [of 
Afghanistan] because schools are the pillars of progress for every nation,” he accepted 
the invitation to observe one of the exams on December 15, 1916.  After a half hour walk 
with Mawlawi Abdul in the center of Kabul city and to the surprise of Adib, the two 
arrived at the school’s big gate.  He had “never thought nor was told, and nor 
remembered that there were these many organized and modernized primary schools in the 
heart of Kabul city.” Adib wrote in his account when he entered inside the school, he was 
so much shocked by the school’s discipline, order, and regulation. Adib spent some two 
hours in the inspection office of the school where “(130) students were taking exams in 
Quranic studies, Persian literature, math, and etc.”90 
During this visit, Adib learned that there were “many other modernized schools in 
Afghanistan.”  He recorded his observation of his visit as follows: 
[he] was entirely convinced that the savior and advancement of every nation and 
government were its schools. Especially, if the schools’ teachers were to be from 
that country’s people because the students could be more patriotic. Patriotism is 
the love of religion, nation, state, and the king. Realization of this love is an 
obligation of every person, without exception. Once realized, it will flow in the 
blood of every person. Without doubts and questions, these [the love of religion, 
nation, state, and the king] are the first foundation of any nation, which wants to 
live free forever.  
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Since Adib was shocked and surprised when he observed the discipline, order, 
and awareness of the Afghan students in Kabul, he wrote that these achievements in 
education were the results of the well-wish, high vision, and patriotic feelings of emir 
Habibullah Khan. A more detailed observation of Adib of the educational reforms and 
educational development in Afghanistan was published as an article in Siraj Al-Akhbar. 
He wrote:  
I would like to give my humble and neutral final observations by praising and 
wishing-continuity for the Government of His Majesty Amir ul’Muminin91 (Siraj 
ul’ Millat Wa Din), who is the cultivator of the seeds of education in 
Afghanistan. It is an absolute obligation for all of the decent people of 
Afghanistan to be thankful of the Almighty God who has granted them and their 
country with such a just, progressive, and patriotic king.
92
  
 
There are two main issues that Adib raises in his discussion of the schools in Kabul 
that frame this chapter’s examination of reforms in education and nationalism in 
Afghanistan. One is the attempt of the Afghan state and the nationalists to establish a new 
kind of education system, which would be public rather than entirely theological and 
religious. Before 1904, education was solely available either in a madrassa, mosque, and 
or at-home where a family member, usually the father, taught their children. There was 
no public school system based on a state-sanctioned curriculum. The curriculum of the 
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 Apart from many terminological problems (such as usage of emir, padshah, and shah 
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madrassa, mosque, and in-home education covered subjects such as Quran, fiq, Islamic 
jurisprudence, hadith or the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, and Perso-Islamic 
literature such as Diwan-e Hafez Shirazi  (the Persian collection of poems from Hafez 
Shirazi who was a fourteenth century Iranian poet).  This curriculum content could help 
students learn the skills of reading and writing in Persian.
93
 Subjects, such as history or 
geography that became popular with nationalism programs and nationalists, were absent 
before 1904. Another issue which Adib raised was the order, discipline, and love-of the 
homeland and the king that were emphasized in the new state-sanctioned curriculum in 
Afghanistan. In the examination of the new state-sanctioned curriculum and the 
organization of the schools in the section immediately below, three questions are 
explored—the examination of the reformed-curriculum, the organization of the schools, 
and how the Afghan state and the nationalists addressed nationalism in Afghanistan in the 
context of reforms in education. Before doing that, it is however useful to know how 
education and nationalism are related nationalistically.  
The variables such as religion, language, geography, and history have strong 
appeals to scholars, and they are important to studying nationalism. But, “a man’s 
education,” as Ernest Gellner explained of the relationship between nationalism and 
education, “is by far his most precious investment, and in effect confers his identity on 
him.” The fundamental output that education produces, according to Gellner, is loyalty of 
the citizens to a nation. This is only possible in a modern nation-state; Gellner calls it 
“Industrial Society.” The pre-condition to such an output is a standardized curriculum, 
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“especially in national subjects like literature, geography, history, and physical 
education.” Since loyalty is gained through the standardized curriculum, the state, the 
monarch, and the nationalists will do everything possible to establish such a curriculum 
in order to instill loyalty to the state, monarch, and nation.
 94
 In Afghanistan too, the state 
and the nationalists tried to establish such a kind of education, which could produce 
loyalty to the state. As a matter of fact, if there was one theme that most thrilled (and kept 
busy) the Afghan nationalists to propagate it throughout the period, 1901-1929, it was the 
importance of modern education for Afghan people.  
The Importance of Education 
The Afghan state and the nationalists propagated that modern education, like the 
one that Europeans had, was necessary for Afghan nation in order to progress. It was 
neither against Islam. It is said, for example, that when Habibullah went to India in 1907, 
in one of his speeches in Lahore he had said: “o my Moslem brethren, endeavor to 
acquire knowledge, so that you may not wear the cloths of the ignorant. It is your duty to 
acquire knowledge. After your children have thoroughly acquainted themselves with the 
principles and laws of the faith of Muhammad, turn their attention towards the 
acquirement of the new sciences, as unless you acquire Western knowledge, you will 
remain without bread.” Habibullah is quoted again thus: “there are those who utter 
solemn warnings in your ears, who urge that Mohammedans have nothing to do with 
modern philosophy, who disclaim against Western sciences as though they are evil. I am 
not among them. I am not among those who ask you to shut your ears and your eyes. On 
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the contrary, I say pursue knowledge wherever it is to be found.”95 After two years of its 
establishment, Siraj Al-Akhbar published an article by Mahmud Tarzi, now the chief 
editor under the title of alem wa ma’rafat or Education & Awareness.96 “Education 
means to be knowledgeable,” wrote Mahmud Tarzi. He continued that education “is the 
ability to distinguish, and to have awareness. Its benefits are obvious from how much 
holy and precious these words are. A nation is like a [human] body, its soul is education. 
A nation is asleep, education awakens it. No nation or a people can neither progress nor 
awake and can’t also survive without education.”97  In another occasion, he published an 
article under the title of “Khuwab dar tariki or Asleep in Darkness.” In the article, he 
goes on to praise the value of modern education for advancement of a nation, and its 
importance specifically to the Afghan nation. He says that Afghans have to learn from 
Japanese. “Take for example,” he writes, “the Japanese who had nothing. Now after some 
years, they have everything. They have knowledge and expertise in society, politics, and 
[political] parties. What did they do? They sent their children all over the world after 
education. Like bees they spread all over the fields of the world. Now, they have 
industry. They have no darkness. This means that their mind has awakened. With 
education and art gained, they have benefited their homeland.”98 
In addition to Mahmud Tarzi who was the pioneer of modern education, and 
wrote on its importance to Afghan nation, several other nationalists also wrote about the 
importance of education. Among them were individuals such as Enyayatullah Khan (the 
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eldest son of Habibullah), Amanullah Khan, (who later becomes king and enlarges the 
scope of reforms), Abdul Hadi Dawi (bureaucrat, poet, educator, and diplomat), 
Muhyiuddin Anis (journalist, writer, and educator), and many more. What is important to 
note here is that the modern education based on a new state-sanction curriculum was 
emphasized for the sake of progress of the Afghan nation as well as for its making of 
Afghans in serve and hold loyalty to the state and the king. To understand the nature of 
the content of this new education and how it was organized, Habibya College’s 
curriculum and administration will be thoroughly examined.  
Habibya College, 1904 
In 1904, Habibullah Khan opened Afghanistan’s first secondary school, called 
“Habibya” College. The level of education and translation of the name of “Habibya” into 
English are problematic. First, there is no consensus on whether “Habibya” was an 
elementary or a secondary school. Many writers have agreed that it could be generally 
labeled as a “college” level institution where both primary and secondary educations 
were offered. Second, many of the textbooks that were taught at “Habibya” classified the 
school variously thus adding to the confusion. For example, all of the following names 
appear in various textbooks for Habibya College: Baytul’ulum-e Mubaraka-e Habibya 
(The Holy Education House of Habibya), Madrasa-e Habibya, (Habibya School), 
Madrasa-e Mubaraka-e Habibya-e Darul Sultana-e Kabul (The Holy Habibya School of 
the Royal Court of Kabul), Maktab-e Habibya (Habibya School), and Lycee Habibya 
(Habibya High School). The third designation, Madrasa-e Mubarak-e Habibya-e Darul 
Sultana-e Kabul appears in Habibya’s Nizamnamah or Law Concerning Habibya (1913).  
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Because of various designations for Habibya, it can be assumed here that there were 
corresponding changes in the school’s curriculum. For example, Habibya was offering 
eleven subjects between 1904 and 1919. In 1929, it offered at least thirteen subjects.
99
 
For the sake of simplicity about the name of Habibya and its level of education, this 
thesis will refer to Habibya as “Habibya College.” The mission of Habibya College was 
to produce loyalty to the emir, “who was just and progressive, and wanted to advance the 
nation” of Afghanistan. In addition to being loyal to the emir, its graduates “would 
provide services that are needed by the government of Afghanistan.”100 Habibya, as it 
was the first modern educational institute in Afghanistan and was named after Habibullah 
himself, had two features that distinguished it from the religious schools.  One was that 
its education was based on the state-sanctioned standardized curriculum. Its other feature 
was the organization of the school.  
Curriculum 
Unlike madrassa, mosque, and in-home education where one was offered religious 
and literacy education, Habibya (and later in the 1920s other schools to follow,) offered 
classes also in science, art, and social sciences such as drawing, history, geography, and 
foreign languages such as Urdu and English. The curriculum was divided into two main 
levels: primary and secondary. The primary level that could take four years to complete 
covered five subjects: Dunyat or Islamic-Teaching, Language (Dari, the Afghan Persian), 
Math, Geography, and Mashqo-Khat or Writing.  Daraja-e rashidya or the secondary 
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level that could last four years had at least thirteen subjects. These were Quran-e Karim, 
Dunyat, Akhlaq wa Malumat-e Madina or Ethics and Citizenry Information, Language, 
Writing & Calligraphy, History, Geography, Mathematics (Algebra, Trigonometry, and 
Geometry), Physics, Chemistry, Natural History (Animals, Plants, and Geology), 
Painting & Drawing, and Music. Some of these subjects were offered collectively. For 
example, Quran and Dunyat or Math and Algebra were taught at one session. For the first 
three years of the secondary level, the students were to learn the science, social science, 
and religious subjects. The fourth year was devoted to learn linguistic and technical 
subjects. For languages, in the secondary level education, one could take one of the 
following languages: Dari, Pashto, Turkish, Arabic, Urdu, and English. What is 
interesting here is that “Pashto,” one of the two main languages of Afghanistan (the other 
being Dari/Persian), was listed next to English as a foreign language. Ghobar, who grew 
up during this time in Kabul and was later in touch with students of Habibya, mentions 
that this was a work of Indian Muslim teachers who were hired to teach at Habibya. They 
used the English textbook that was taught in India where the British taught Pashto and 
English as foreign languages. Ghobar wrote that “the contents of the English textbook 
about Afghan history were pejorative.” More than that, he argues that the Indian Muslim 
teachers were not effective and productive because in India as “Muslims, they were not 
having access to technical, chemical, and scientific education such as mineralogy, 
engineering, and political philosophy. They only had two options as Muslim students: 
either study religious or Arabic linguistic studies.”101  
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Aside from science and technical subjects, Habibya and other schools found social 
science subjects such as history, geography, and literature more interesting because they 
related to nationalism. In Habibya, for example, the new curriculum was to make it 
possible for an Afghan to study the history, geography, and literature of not only 
Afghanistan, but also other nations. To understand the new state-sanctioned curriculum 
and discuss its relationship to the development of nationalism in Afghanistan, few of the 
textbooks that were used in Habibya and other schools are thoroughly explored below. In 
here, two social science subjects are examined: history and geography.   
In Geography & History of Afghanistan, a primary textbook for secondary and higher 
education students including students of Habibya, the goal was to introduce the history 
and territory of Afghanistan. Mohammad Ali Khan, the author of Geography & History 
of Afghanistan, was a teacher in Habibya. He wrote in his introduction of the book that he 
had used English sources for writing Geography & History of Afghanistan. Therefore, 
everything could not be granted as true. However, he thought that it was still necessary to 
write a textbook about the history and geography of Afghanistan. Ali Khan had used 
twenty sources, mostly books that were produced in British Colonial India by the colonial 
officials. From the twenty sources, thirteen of them are famous colonial accounts 
including Mountstuart Elphinstone’s An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul (1815), 
Alexander Burns’ Travels Into Bokhara (1834), and Encyclopedia Britannica. 
 Geography & History of Afghanistan is divided into two parts: part one talks 
about the territory of Afghanistan while part two is about the history of Afghanistan. 
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“Afghanistan is located,” reads chapter one of Geography & History, “in the center of 
Asia. Its three neighbor countries are Hindustan, Bokhara, and Russia. Since many of its 
people are Afghans, which is why it is named Afghanistan.”102 The book then talks about 
rivers, mountains, passes, mineral mines and resources, climate, animals, plants, 
agricultures, crafts, and merchandises of Afghanistan. Take for example Afghan crafts 
and industry. When it introduces the crafts and industry that are available in Afghanistan, 
the book writes: “for the progress and improvement of the country, the government had 
enacted laws that intend to promote the crafts and industry in the country. At the same 
time, it encourages people to purchase goods of watan or the homeland rather than 
foreign.” “Well-liked goods of” Afghanistan, the book lists, are “carpets, silks, and 
karakuls.”103  
After situating the territorial location of Afghanistan in Asia and its neighbor 
countries, the chapter of Geography & History, “History of Afghanistan,” introduces the 
ancient, medieval, and modern history of Afghanistan. It introduces Afghans as a people 
who ““before Islam, identified themselves as descendent of Saul, the King of Israel.” 
However, Afghanistan “was known to Greeks as Aria or Arianna, Afghanistan’s ancient 
name. Afghans had always lived independently. They have defended their country 
against Alexander, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Nadir Afshar [eighteenth century Turkic-
Persian Shah of Iran], and British.” 104 The rest of the chapter on the history of 
                                                          
102
 Mohammad Ali Khan, History & Geography of Afghanistan (Lahore: Matb-e Mufid 
Amman, 1927), 7. 
103
Ibid,  50-2 
104
 Ibid, see pages 56-58. For a historiographical Theory of Afghans beings one of the 
Ten Lost Tribes of Israel, see Jewish Virtual Library, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/vjw/Afghanistan.html and for contemporary history 
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Afghanistan narrates the same traditional introduction of Afghanistan’s history: 
Afghanistan is ancient Ariana, the main-home of Aryans. When Alexander conquered 
Persia, the Greek Kingdoms established themselves as Greek-Bactrian Kingdoms in the 
second and first century B.C in Afghanistan. Afterward, the Buddhist Kushan Empire 
was established in Afghanistan from where it ruled up to India, and “Afghan and Indian 
Buddhist monks spread Buddhism to China.”105 However, later, Islam spread and 
Afghanistan became a Muslim country. After becoming Muslim, Afghanistan 
experienced several foreign invasions such as “when Mongol Barbarians invaded” it.106 
However, Ahmad Shah Abdali created modern Afghanistan in 1747. Then, Afghanistan 
had several confrontations with the British in the nineteenth century in which “people of 
Afghanistan never lost, and lived free.”107  
 In addition to the Geography & History of Afghanistan which was taught in the 
1920s in Habibya and other schools in Kabul, Mahmud Tarzi had published an earlier 
secondary education geography-history textbook, Mukhtasar-e Jughrafya’ya-e Omomi: A 
Brief Introduction to General Geography (1915). Tarzi’s book, General Geography is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of Jews in Afghanistan, see Erich Brauer, “The Jews of Afghanistan: An Anthropological 
Report,” Jewish Social Studies 4, no. 2 (1942),121-138. It should be noted that the Jewish Theory 
is in complete contradiction to the “generalized” theory that Afghans are Aryans, and that is so 
because their country was the original “native” homeland of the “Aryan Race.” As it was 
addressed in the introduction of the paper, the Afghan Jewish Theory was a colonial imagination 
of Sir William Jones, and other colonial officials in India. In here, the point to note is that the 
Afghan nationalists dropped the Jewish Theory in favor of “Aryan” Theory.  
105
 See Kohzad (2008), 481.  
106
 Khan (1927), 59 
107
 Ibid, 56-61. This is the traditional narrative of Afghanistan’s history that was taught at 
schools in the 1920s. Like Mohammad Ali Khan’s textbook Geography and History of 
Afghanistan, see for example Sayed Mohammad Hashim’s Khulasa-e Tarikh-e Watan; A Brief 
History of the Homeland (1921), which has similar narrative. Hashim’s Brief History of the 
Homeland was prepared for elementary-primary schools while Mohammad Ali Khan’s was for 
secondary and higher education students.  
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more interesting than Mohammad Ali Khan’s Geography & History for three main 
reasons. One is that it introduces Afghan nation against other nations, which becomes 
important for self-identification.
108
 Second, the book was prepared for high schools, and 
specifically it was taught in the newly established Military School (1904-6 or 1909?) 
where Tarzi was offered a class to teach geography and history.
109
 Third, General 
Geography could have been appropriately named a “World Geography” or “Atlas of the 
World” rather than General Geography because of its in-depth coverage and provision of 
so much ethnographic, geographical, and historical information about the world and its 
people.  
Tarzi had the contents of General Geography divided into seven parts: Afghanistan, 
General Geography, Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australia. Each part had several 
lessons; for example, Australia had four lessons while Europe and Africa had each 19 and 
21 lessons. At the end of each part, there was a table that had a list of famous cities, 
lakes, rivers, islands, mountains, and a map of the particular continent (see figures 
below). Then, all the way to the end of each part, there was a list of questions that 
students had to answer.  
                                                          
108
 In chapter four, “Symbolizing Afghanistan,” the subject of self-identification and 
representation of Afghan nation against “other” nations will be discussed thoroughly.  
109
 Mahmud Tarzi, Mukhtasar-e Jughrafya’ya-e Omomi: A Brief Introduction to General 
Geography (Kabul: Matb-e Tipugraphi, 1915). 4. The date of establishment of Madrasa-e 
Harbiya-e Sirajya, The Sirajya-e Military School, is not at least exact. Ghobar mentions that it 
was established in 1909 while Gregorian (using Siraj ul ‘Akhbar) mentions that it was established 
between 1904 and 1906. Regardless of which date, in this paper, the focus is not on military 
reforms of the era, 1901-1929, which make a complex and completely different topic of its own 
for study, though of course, they have their own connections and implications for studies of 
nationalism in Afghanistan.  
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Take for example, its eleven lessons of the continent of Asia, twenty one lessons of 
the continent of Africa, and nineteen lessons of Europe. Once these three continents’ 
geographical and ethnographic information, names of the countries, population, famous 
cities, rivers, and mountains were taught to students, then, the students were evaluated for 
content knowledge. 
Asia, “Exam Questions:” 
 
1. How much is the total area of Asia? 
2.  How many countries exist in Asia? 
3.  How many people live in Asia? 
4.  Name the countries [of Asia]? 
5. How many governors Anatolia had? 
6.  What are Anatolia’s famous cities? 
7. How many people lived in Arabia? 
8.  Where is Mecca located and how many people live there? 
9. What is the capital of Yemen? 
10. How much is the total area of Afghanistan? 
11.  How many people live in Afghanistan? 
12. What are the provinces of Afghanistan? 
13.  Where is located Prophet Muhammad’s cloak,110 
14. In which river’s bank the city of Herat is located? 
15.  In which part of [Afghanistan] the Afghan Turkestan Province is located? 
                                                          
110
 It is believed that a cloak, which was brought to Kandahar, Afghanistan’s Southern 
Province by Ahmad Shah, the so-called “founder” of Afghanistan in 1760s, was worn by 
Muhammad.  
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16.  Where Jalalabad is located, and are there any other provinces [in 
Afghanistan]? 
17. Is Siam a country and is it controlled by another foreign country?111 
18. Where in Asia Japan is located?112 
19. How many people live in Japan, what are its famous cities, and what have 
been the reasons for its advancement and development?  
20. What is the capital of Iran? 
21.  What are the famous rivers of Asia? 
22.  What are the famous mountains of Asia?113 
                                                          
111
 This question has a lot to do with nationalism in Afghanistan because Afghan 
nationalists’ view was that Afghanistan was not a colonized nation, and so like Afghanistan, Siam 
(modern Thailand), was one of the only Asian countries that could hold its sovereignty over its 
territories and people against the rising colonial activities of the European colonialism in 
Southeast Asia. For an excellent but also theoretical discussion of Thai Nationalism and 
Colonialism, see Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism, especially pages 171-175. 
112
 Like Siam, Japan had a special place among Afghan nationalists between 1901 and 
1933, and then beyond up to now. They saw Japan and Siam along with Afghanistan as 
independent nations of Asia against European colonialism. Japan was an example for the reforms, 
development, and modernity of Afghanistan. As matter of fact, Mahmud Tarzi, translated several 
volumes of the history of Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 when an Asia power defeated and 
destroyed a European imperial power. The Russo-Japanese War actually became an important 
event for many nationalisms of Asia such as the Indian, Iranian, and others. See two useful 
articles on the role of Russo-Japanese War and nationalisms in Asia by B. Nicolaevsky, “Russia, 
Japan, and the Pan-Asiatic Movement to 1925,” The Far Eastern Quarterly, 8, no. 3 (1949), 259-
295; and  Paul Rodell, “Southeast Asian Nationalism and the Russo-Japanese War: Reexamining 
Assumptions,” Southeast Review of Asian Studies, 29 (2007), 20-40.  
113
 There are 24 more questions about Asia. See Tarzi (1915) pages 38-39 for the 
complete list of the questions.  
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Map of Asia, used in Afghanistan’s Education System, 1915-1929 
(Figure, 4) 
114
 
Africa, “Exam Questions:” 
1. How much is the total area of Africa? 
2.  How many countries exist in Africa, and how many people live in Africa? 
3. Which countries [in Africa] are under the Ottoman Empire? 
4. Which are the “Berberestan” [the Berbers’] countries and in which part of 
Africa they are located? 
5. Which are the Sub-Sahara countries? 
6.  What countries exist in East Africa?  
7. What are the famous rivers, lakes, and gulfs of Africa? 
8. Which Government is ruling in Madagascar? 
9. Where in Africa Hopetown is located?  
10. In which country the Atlas Mountains are located? 
11.  Where does the Nile River fall?115  
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  Ibid. See page 40 for the map of Asia.  
115
 Ibid, p. 48. It is said by Ghobar that by 1928 Afghanistan signed a diplomatic treaty 
with Liberia, which was along with Ethiopia, an “independent” country in Africa where she was 
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Map of Africa, used in Afghanistan’s Education System, 1915-1929 
(Figure, 5) 
116
 
Europe, “Exam Questions” 
1. How many countries exist in Europe? Mention their capitals and population.  
2. On which side of Europe Atlantic Ocean is located, and what are the famous 
seas of Europe?  
3.  Where is and who owns Shetland Island?  
4. In which Sea the Gulf of Bothnia located, and where is the Malta Island? 
5. The Baltic Sea is made of which ocean? 
6. In which country the Balkan Mountains are located?  
7. What is the name of the strait that is between Spain and Africa?  
                                                                                                                                                                             
not colonized. See Ghobar (1987), p. 789. Where this treaty took place, who signed them on 
behalf of Liberia and Afghanistan, why, and what does this explain about the nationalism 
activities in Asia and Africa among the so-called uncolonized nations of Asia and Africa, are 
questions that are yet unstudied. In chapter four, “Symbolizing Afghanistan,” Afghanistan’s 
foreign relations and their relationship to nationalism in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929 will 
be discussed.  
116
 Ibid, p. see page 49 for the map of Africa.  
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8. Where is Caspian Sea?  
9. If you would travel to London from Istanbul, what seas you will travel 
through?  
 
Map of Europe, used in Afghanistan’s Education System, 1915-1929 
(Figure, 6) 
117
 
 
Tarzi in his General Geography, and Mohammad Ali Khan in his Geography & 
History of Afghanistan, provided the tips here to situate the kind of curriculum the 
Afghan state sanctioned in the new educational system between 1904 and 1929. Mahmud 
Tarzi and Mohammad Ali Khan were not the first people to write a historical-geography 
textbook in Afghanistan. In 1905, a textbook, Marat’al Arz or the Earth was prepared and 
printed in Lahore, then British India, for elementary schools in Kabul. The book is 
something like a World History-Geography textbook, which introduces first the shape, 
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 Ibid, see page 23 for the map of Europe.  
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size, and movement of the earth, and then the continents, and then continents’ location, 
population, religion, and language of individual country. Like all of these individuals, 
several other publishers made available other textbooks to the newly state-sanctioned 
curriculum that introduced the geography and history of Afghanistan in relation to the 
world. Sayed Mohammad Hashim, for example, published Khulasa-e Tarikhi-e Watan or 
the Brief History of the Homeland in 1912.  
In addition to Afghanistan’s people, geography, rivers, mountains, provinces, and 
lakes, these textbooks covered pan-Islamic ideas (e.g. “which countries in Africa are 
under the Ottoman Empire”), pan-Asian nationalism (e.g. the political independences of 
Japan, Siam as opposite to the colonized nations of Asia), and ethnographic information 
(e.g. population, lakes, and races). But more than the newly state-sanctioned curriculum, 
it becomes interesting to review and understand the organization and administration of 
schooling in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1929: how schools and students were 
organized, ordered, and controlled?   
Organization  
The education, progress, and ethics of the people of [Afghan] nation depend 
on [how successfully] the administration of the primary schools of the 
government [is carried out] where dear students of watan, the homeland, can 
learn the required needs of education and the world, and develop intellect and 
ability to enter into secondary and higher education….As per His Majesty, Siraj 
ul ‘Millat wa Din’s [attention], the educational reforms and education are 
improved in some degree. Unlike the past [where only mosques and madrassas 
existed], the primary and secondary schools are increasing more and more in the 
heart of Darul Sultana [Kabul city] where many students are educated. However, 
there was a need to have a separate law concerning the enforcement of rules and 
disciplines, and administration of primary schools.
118
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 This is a portion of a preface from Nizamnamah-e Makateb-e Iptidaya: Law 
Concerning the Elementary-Primary Education (1914).  
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From 1904 until 1929, the organization of schools was becoming more ordered and 
regulated. In 1911 when Anjuman-e Maref or the Association of Education, the 
predecessor of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Education was established, the educational 
system was already regulated and ordered. In 1913, Nizamnamah Madrasa-e Mubarak-e 
Habibya Darul Sultana Kabul or Law Concerning Habibya College was passed. A year 
later in 1914, Nizamnamah-e Tashkilat-e Maktab-e Iptidaya or Law Concerning the 
Primary Schools was passed, and in 1921 it was re-enacted. In 1923 when Amanullah 
Khan’s regime created the so-called “Afghanistan’s First Constitution,” primary 
education for both boys and girls was made compulsory. 
119
 In the same year, 
Nizamnamah Maktab-e Khanagee or Law Concerning Home-School was passed. In 
1928, the government enacted educational Hidayat wa Majazat or Guidelines and 
Punishments in education, which defined and created punishment and types of 
punishments for students who committed offences such as incomplete homework or 
frequent absentees. There were five kinds of punishments: rebuking, suspension, over-
assignments, after-school work, and physical punishment.
120
  
To understand the organization, administration, and how schooling and students were 
ordered, supervised, and eventually controlled, between 1901 and 1933, Habibya 
College’s Nizamnamah (1911) is examined thoroughly.  
In 1911 after nine years from its establishment, Nizamnamah Madrasa-e Mubaraka-e 
Habibya Darul Sultana-e Kabul ordered Habibya. There was now an established chain of 
supervision. Any wrongdoings against or failures to enforce Habiby’s Nizamnamah were 
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 Government of Afghanistan (1923), 68
th
 article of the 1923 constitution.  
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 Later, these punishments will be explored more in detailed.  
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unacceptable because the Nizamnamah was “approved by His Majesty, Siraj ul Millat wa 
Din, who has cared, supported, and paid attention to the administration and improvement 
of education and schools for the education of the people of Government of Afghanistan.  
And Habibya College of Darul Sultana Kabul has been special for him since his 
enthroning. Therefore, for the betterment and reforms of the rules and regulations of the 
college, the articles of this law are created by the collective consensus of the Association 
of Education of Government of Afghanistan.” 121 Upon the enactment of the Nizamnamah 
for Habibya, the following appointments were made for the school: a General Inspector, a 
Sarashta Dar or Principal, a Librarian, a Tahweeldar-e Omomi or General Accounting-
Procurement Official, a Tahweeldar-e Saman-e Tabiyat or a Printing-Publishing Official, 
a School Doctor, and Clerks. According to the newly established academic and penal 
codes, students and teachers were responsible for their assigned duties both inside and 
outside of the school. 
122
 
 The General Inspector was responsible for making sure that the rules and 
regulations of the Nizamnamah were enforced. Without any notice to the school and 
students, the inspector visited Habibya once a week. He was also to inspect twice a year 
all of the school’s accounting or cash-offices, tahweel’khana’ha and operations. If there 
were any shortcomings or changes in the operation of the school, the inspector had to find 
the causes. For instance, if Sarashta Dar or the Principal of the school was absent 
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 Nizamnamah Habibya, Law Concerning Habibya, (1911), 2.  
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without reason, the inspector had to deduct from his salaries for days that he was 
absent.
123
 
Sarashta Dar was responsible for the supervision and management of Habibya and 
also other primary schools. Between 1904 when Habibya was established and 1919 when 
Habibullah was assassinated, there were only six primary schools in Kabul city. 
According to one source, all of the six were “branches of Habibya College.”124 Sarashta 
Dar was also responsible to inform, consult with, and recommend to the Education 
Association of Afghanistan about the replacement of textbooks, performance of each staff 
including teachers and their promotion, and selection of needy children who could be 
supported by the local elders of Kabul districts. In addition, Sarashta Dar was to track 
the presence and absence of the staff and teachers, determine their payroll scales, and 
make sure that the library and offices were kept clean. At the end of each academic year, 
he was to have a general meeting with the teachers to seek and collect their advices and 
suggestions about the school. In short, Sarashta Dar was to inform the Education 
Association about everything that took place in Habibya including supervision of the 
exams. In effect, he presented a “fully detailed-three monthly report” about the quality 
and improvement of exams and everything that affected the school. 
125
 Like the General 
Inspector and Sarashta Dar, all other staff and teachers were hierarchically supervised.  
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 Ibid, 3-4.  
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 Ghobar (1987), 702. Ghobar provides the names of these schools: Maktab-e Iptidaya 
or primary school of Bagh-e Nawab, Tanor Sazi, Khafiha, Paranchaha, Khudam Hozur-e Aali, 
and Hanud. Hanud was a Sikh’s school.  The author could not find any information about what 
subjects were taught, who were the teachers at this school since the Sikhs were (and are today) a 
different religious and ethnic community in Afghanistan unlike the predominantly Muslims 
population. 
125
 Nizamnamah Habibya (1911), 4-5 
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In fact, the chain of supervision of the administration and supervision of Habibya went all 
the way up to the emir: the emir was informed of developments in the school by the 
Education Association, whose head was Enyayatullah, Muin’ul Sultana or Assistant to 
the Emir, who was also Habibullah Khan’s eldest son. The Education Association 
supervised Sarashta Dar, who in turn supervised Habibya’s staff, teachers, and 
students.
126
 
For students, their activities in classrooms and in their homes were also supervised 
and ordered. A student could not be admitted first of all at Habibya College unless he had 
the permission of his guardians, was between six and fifteen years old, had already 
finished primary education, and was fully healthy. After a student was admitted at 
Habibya, there were both rewards and penalties for him. Students who were decent and 
paid attention to their studies were rewarded as their assignments were evaluated on a 
scale of “well-done, excellent, and awarded prizes.”  For example, a student could earn 
60 points for a subject every week. From the 60, 30 to 40 points gained, a student 
received an assessment of “well-done”. Additional 40 to 50 points could give him 
“excellent,” and the additional of 50 to 60 extra points could make it possible for him to 
win a “prize.” In order to be eligible to earn the rewards, which were one rupee for 
elementary-primary student, two rupees for secondary education student, and three rupees 
for high school student, a student needed 12 prizes.
127
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 For more information about the roles and responsibilities of each staff (Sarashta Dar, 
Assistant to Sarashta Dar, Publisher, Accounting and Procurement Official, Inventory Official, 
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In addition to these prizes, there were two other main kinds of awards. One was the 
annual awards that were given to three students who earned the first, second, and third 
ranks in their classes. The other was the monthly award, in the form of financial aid for 
an eligible student.  Figure 7 (below) is one example of these awards that were offered 
for primary education students who could take first, second, and third ranks in their 
classes. It is useful to note that there was no award offered for the first year students of 
primary education without regards to their rank in the class.128  
(Figure 7, Awards’ Chart for Primary Education Students) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Conversely, students were punished to bring in order to enforce the disciplines and 
establish order in the institution. Overall, there were three main kinds of punishments: 
physical, verbal (in front of teachers and students), and ousting from the school. Either of 
the following situations could bring physical punishments to a student: if he was absent 
or went out of school or class without permission, though the student was not to be 
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 Ibid, see pages 14-15 for tables of the awards for students of secondary and higher 
education.  
(Awards for Primary Education) 
 
First Year   (There is no Award) 
 
Second Year:  
 1
st
 Rank—5 Rupee 
 2
nd
 Rank—4 Rupee 
 3
rd
 Rank—3 Rupee 
Third Year: 
 1
st
 Rank—6 Rupee 
 2
nd
  Rank—5 Rupee 
 3
rd
 Rank—4 Rupee 
Fourth Year  
 1
st
 Rank—8 Rupee 
 2
nd
  Rank—6 Rupee 
 3
rd
 Rank—5 Rupee 
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punished if he had gone for prayer; If he had not done the homework; and or if he had 
fought, either physically or verbally with other students of the school in and or outside 
the school premise or in the bazaars. A student could miss a day if he had a written notice 
submitted the next day for the teacher or assistant of Sarashta Dar from his parents.
129
 
However, this notice will be valid only for three days of absences. Decision for a week of 
absence was left to the discretion of only Sarashta Dar. For a month, only the General 
Inspector could allow students to be absent. However, for more than a month, Muin’ul 
Sultana or the Assistant to the Emir will make the decision.
130
 A student could be 
verbally punished in front of teachers and students if he had committed the following 
wrongdoings: smoking; gambling; fighting; and showing carelessness to the teacher and 
parents. A student was to be expelled from the school if he had been verbally punished 
three times in front of teachers and students, and or if he had conducted or caused 
immoral activities at school and to his classmates. However, if a student was to be 
expelled, the school could not do it by itself. Several teachers along with Sarashta Dar 
had to make a collective decision, and then inform the Education Association where the 
Assistant to the Emir was to make the final expelling decision. 
131
 
In addition to the administrative and academic supervision of Habibya College and 
students, and rewards and punishments, Habibya’s Nizamnamah established rules and 
regulations for the conduct of exams, library administration, registrar office, and the 
leaves. For example, articles 38 and 39 of Habibya’s Nizamnamah regulated and ordered 
exams to take place three times a year—two of them written and one verbal-written 
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exam. The two written exams were only for secondary and higher educational (Teacher 
Training) students.  Written exams were conducted twice a year while the one verbal-
written exam was conducted once a year. The written exams did not have to last more 
than one week. Other articles, 39 to 52, created additional rules and regulations that 
ordered and regulated the exams, students, and the school.
132
  
Chapter three, conclusion 
Between 1904 and 1929, the Afghan state brought about a number of reforms 
primarily in the educational system in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.  These reforms 
were later extended to other major urbanate provinces. The Afghan state and the 
nationalists propagated the importance of modern education (in addition to the religious 
learning) for Afghans in the name of modernizing and progress. The new education had a 
state-sanctioned curriculum and laws that aimed at cultivating Afghan loyalty to the state, 
and to serve it. The students were required to behave orderly and regularly in accordance 
to the established rules and codes. Failures to do so and successes to accomplish the 
rules, regulations, and laws of the curriculum and school could bring punishments and 
rewards. Throughout the era, 1904-1929, Habibya College remained a model to be 
imitated by other schools in Kabul and the country. However, in addition to Habibya and 
its six branches in Kabul, many other reforms in education took place and laws were 
enacted to regulate and order them. In the 1920s, three other secondary schools, one 
French (Aman-ya, 1922), another German (Amani, 1923), and Ghazi (1927, with English 
as the language of medium instruction) were established in Kabul.
 
Observing that the 
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neighboring and Muslim countries such as Iran had already been sending their nationals 
to study in Europe, in 1921 and 1922 a total of 80 students (from “upper-class families”) 
were sent to study in France and Germany.
133
 In the 1920s, the state opened girls’ schools 
too. 
134
 These reforms and laws were enacted in order to help the Afghan state to 
establish a new kind of education that was to be regulated and ordered so that 
Afghanistan could progress as a modern nation where students could serve the state.  
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 Gregorian (1967), 242. On the issue of observing the neighboring countries, Tulu-e 
Afghan-the Rise of Afghan, the first newspaper of Afghanistan’s southern province, Kandahar 
(established in 1921), published an article under the title “Sending of Iranian Students [to 
Europe].” In the article, the author suggests to its readers that “Afghanistan’s neighbor Iran had 
decided to send a large number of students to Europe for education. Iran has already sent a group 
of ten students. They are now in Constantinople on their way to Europe.” See Tulu-e Afghan, 1st 
Year, No. 25, p. 2.  Interestingly, this is the same year as Amanullah sends 80 Afghan students to 
France and Germany.  
134
 See Gregorian (1967) pages 243-244 for a discussion of girls’ education in the 1920s 
in Afghanistan.  
  
Chapter Four: Symbolizing Afghanistan, 1901-1929 
I would like to inform you my dear country fellow brothers about my trip so that you and 
other brothers of mine should become aware of why Amanullah traveled to foreign 
countries. The purpose of my trip to foreign countries is known in some degree among 
those of you who are the servants of the government because on the day of my departure, 
November 30, 1927, I announced it, and you agreed with me. The idea to traveling to 
Europe was suggested to me by the Cabinet Ministers Council. Of course, you the 
conscious group better know that my purpose was to examine the scientific progress and 
establish friendly relations with the foreign states in order to let the world become aware 
of Afghanistan’s state of affairs and we would become fully aware of the world. It is very 
hard to live alone in the world. A people must form relationships with other international 
human community, and ought to live according to the conditions, science, and technology 
of the time. Today, Europe is the center of material progress. Of course, we are not lesser 
than anybody in our integrity, and we consider our holy religion Islam better than 
everybody’s. And we don’t need to imitate anybody in this. However, in regards to the 
material progress of the world, we have to imitate the materially advanced centers of the 
world. 
135
 
 
  
 The above passage is a portion of Amanullah’s statement that was delivered to 
students and employees, who were brought near the newly constructed building, Qasr-e 
Stor or the Star Palace, the building of the Foreign Ministry to hear from Amanullah 
about his trip to a number of countries in Asia and Europe.
136
  For the Afghan state and 
the nationalists in Kabul it was important to symbolize Afghanistan because 
symbolization of the country legitimated their nationalism both inside and outside 
Afghanistan. In here, symbolization or symbols are used to designate a situation in which 
one state or a people claim sovereignty over a territory and culture. This was indeed the 
situation with the Afghan nationalists who constantly tried to introduce Afghanistan as a 
sovereign country that had its own territory, people, and culture. For instance, Habibullah 
created a National Unity Day, which functioned as a symbol of unity of Afghan people. 
Afghans were encouraged to appreciate and celebrate the day and “feel obligated to be 
thankful for his majesty, and love the just, progressive, and thoughtful king of the Afghan 
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nation.”137 Although during Habibullah’s reign (1901-1919) a number of efforts were 
carried out in order to symbolize Afghanistan as a nation of its own among other nations 
of the world, the major efforts in symbolization of Afghanistan were carried out between 
1919 and 1929.  
Therefore, this chapter will focus on the symbolization efforts of the Afghan state 
and nationalists during this period, 1919-1929.  The chapter is divided into two parts. Part 
one will discuss the symbolization efforts that were carried out inside Afghanistan. Part 
two will discuss the external symbolization efforts of the Afghan state and the 
nationalists.  
Part One: Internally Symbolized Afghanistan 
The period between 1919 and 1929 can be safely characterized as an era of 
incrusted state symbols in Afghanistan. The symbols were created to symbolize 
Afghanistan both at home and abroad in order to legitimate the “Afghan state” in the eyes 
of people.  At home, the symbols appeared generally in two forms. One was ceremonial 
celebration of national themes and days, and another was tangible symbols such as flags. 
The National Day of Independence, the National Anthem, the National Holiday, the 
National Education, the National History, and the Father of Nation were major symbolic 
ceremonies and constructs while “The National Medal,” “The National Flag,” and 
“national currency” became tangible symbols of the state. For instance, between 1922 
and 1929, there were at least ten ‘national’ medals invented to decorate the Afghan 
nation. Six out of the ten national medals (see figures below) were ceremonial and 
relevant to the symbolization of Afghanistan. These were Nishan-e Lemar or the Sun 
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Medal, Nishan-e Isteqlal or the Independence Medal, Nishan-e Stor or the Star Medal, 
Nishan-e Wafa or the Loyalty Medal, Nishan-e Loy Khan or the Great Khan Medal, and 
Nishan-e Shuja ‘at or the Bravery Medal.138 For example, Nishan-e Lemar was the 
highest medal of Afghanistan. It was given to a person, Afghan or foreigner, who had 
provided an exceptional service either militarily or politically in and or outside 
Afghanistan, which had improved significantly the situation and status of Afghan people, 
and had increased the greatness of the kingdom.  
When Amanullah went to Egypt, as part of his grand tour of Asia-Africa-Europe, 
he honored Fuad I, King of Egypt (r. 1917-1936) with a Nishan-e Lemar, though this 
author has not found anything that could reveal what did Fuad I had done to “improve 
significantly the situation and status of Afghan people” in order to receive the Nishan-e 
Lemar.
139
 However, it could be possible that he was honored for his reception and 
welcoming of Amanullah and his delegation in Egypt.
140
 Persons nominated to receive 
Nishan-e Lemar were introduced to the king by the Minister’s Council. In addition to its 
actual ornamented metallic symbol, Nishan-e Lemar’s prize was two kinds. One could 
earn the highest honor of Lemar or the high honor of Lemar. For the highest honor, the 
prize was five hundred jerib lands (one jerib equals to 10,000 square meters) with 50, 
000 rupees cash. And Lemar’s high honor prize was two hundred fifty jerib lands with 
15, 000 rupees cash.
141
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 For the complete list of the medals, see Nizamnamah-e Nishanahay-e Zeenishan 
Dawlat-e Aalay-e Afghanistan: Law Concerning the Medals of Government of Afghanistan 
(1922) 
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 See Popalzai (1986) page 72 for Nishan-e Lemar that was given to Fuad I of Egypt.  
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 Later in this chapter, Amanullah’s visit to Egypt is discussed in detail.  
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Another medal, for example, that had a local symbolic appealing inside 
Afghanistan was Nishan-e Loy Khan or the Great Khan Medal. This was to be given to a 
person who had accomplished some kind of patriotic works and had improved 
brotherhood relations among Afghans inside Afghanistan. Its prize was the title Loy 
Khan with forty jerib lands.
142
  
(Figures, 8 and 9: Lemar Highest and High Honor Medals) 
8, Highest Lemar       9, High Lemar 
    
 
The Persian text beneath figure 9, right image, reads: “Nishan-e Lemar Aali, 
Lemar High Medal—is created in the year 1920 by the Council of the 
Government of Afghanistan.” 
 
(Figures, 10 and 11, Independence Medals) 
10      11 
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 Ibid, 13: in 1928 when Amanullah was satisfied with the preparation, arrangement, 
and planning of his visit in Egypt and Turkey, Ghulam Jilani Charkhi (1886-1933), who was 
Afghanistan’s Minister to Turkey, was “honored” with Nishan-e Lemar Aali or Nishan-e Lemar’s 
High Honor. see Ibid, 92.  
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(Figure, 12:  Nishan-e Loy Khan or the Great Khan) 
12  
 
The Persian beneath Figure 12, above image, reads: “Nishan-e Loy 
Khan—is created in the spring of 1920 by the Government Council.”143 
 
 In addition to the medals that became tangible symbols of nationalism in 
Afghanistan and represented and legitimated the state power, the Afghan state and the 
nationalists changed Afghanistan’s flag four times between 1919 and 1929 in order to 
find a ‘national’ flag. When Amanullah came to power in 1919, he abolished the previous 
government and personal flags that existed in the country. In the first attempt, the flag 
was decorated with a royal insignia on the top of a domed mosque with two crossed 
swords beneath it. The whole flag was positioned within a circle, and was surrounded by 
rays, which in turn made the flag an eight-pointed star.
144
  This was also the first official 
or national flag of Afghanistan because it was adopted in 1919 when Afghanistan became 
an independent country.  The second attempt was in 1926 when the 1919 flag was 
modified, in which the two crossed swords, the royal insignia, and the eight-pointed star 
were replaced with wreath, though the domed mosque still stayed in the center of the 
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 For a list of all medals with their images, see the Images Section of Popalzai (1985).  
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 According to Habib Borjian (1999), this eight-pointed star was an imitation of the 
Ottoman Royal flags of the 1900s. This could be possible because Mahmud Tarzi, who had spent 
many years in the Ottoman Empire, became instrumental after 1919 when he was appointed as 
Foreign Minister of Afghanistan.  See Habib Borian’s informative and useful entry, "Flags of 
Afghanistan." Encyclopedia Iranica. http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/flags-ii (accessed 
February 16, 2012). 
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whole flag. In 1928 when Amanullah came back from Europe where he saw that the 
European countries’ flags (e.g. France’s flag) were tricolor and non-religious and 
represented ‘progress,’ he also changed Afghanistan’s flag. Now, the mosque was 
replaced, and the new tricolor (black, red, and green) flag had a chain of mountains, a 
rising sun from behind the mountains, a star, and two sheaves of wheat.
145
 Apparently, 
the black color represented Afghanistan’s past anti-colonial opposition. Red showed the 
struggle of Afghans during and for independence and the green, optimism, was about the 
future of Afghanistan. In 1929 when Nader Khan was enthroned, he replaced the 
mountains and the rising sun with the mosque and an eight-pointed star, though he kept 
Amanullah’s tricolor.  
(Figure, 13: Afghanistan’s 1919-1926 Flag) 
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 The role of “sheaves of wheat” has a symbolic significance among the Afghan 
nationalists. The story goes that in 1747 “after nine days of talk during an assembly of the Afghan 
tribes, Ahmad Abdali [the so-called “founder” of Afghanistan] was enthroned by Saber Shah-e 
Kabuli….Saber, who was a religious and political Sufi, stood up in the assembly and introduced 
Ahmad Abdali as the king and placed a sheaf instead of a crown in the hat/turban of him.” So, 
since Ahmad Abdali, whom is characterized as the “father of nation,” was enthroned with sheaf 
or sheaves wheat, the nationalists also adopted the sheaves in important symbolic and ceremonial 
occasions of Afghanistan. For enthroning of Ahmad Shah Abdali/Durrani, see Ghobar (1987), 
354-355. 
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(Figure, 14: Afghanistan’s 1928-1929 Flag) 
 
146
 
 
 Besides the symbolical construction of the medals and the flags that symbolized 
and legitimated the state power inside Afghanistan (presumably representing the 
influence of the Afghan elites), the symbolic ceremonies of the period between 1919 and 
1929 become more interesting. This is so because it was during these occasions that the 
state and the nationalists propagated Afghanistan as a nation among other nations of the 
world. It was in these symbolic ceremonies where people were brought, lined up, and 
grouped to listen to and watch Afghanistan’s modern statesmen.  
The ceremonies themselves varied because there were many kinds of symbolic 
ceremonies. For instance, they could be from the birthday or wedding ceremony and 
celebration of a royal family member or the celebration of the departure or arrival of 
Afghan students from and to abroad.
147
 However, the major symbolic ceremonies of the 
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 For the images of the flags that were adopted in Afghanistan between 1901 and 1933, 
see Borjian (1999). His piece also offers a useful description and the images of the flags of 
Afghanistan after 1933 until the Taliban who had a simple plain white flag.  
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 In 1922 when Afghanistan’s first 40 students (all of them from the upper class 
families) arrived safely in Paris, the Government had asked people in the center of provinces to 
gather together and pray and wish for their successes in Europe. One of those occasions, for 
example, took place in the provincial town of Farah where the judges, government officials, and 
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era were Jashan-e Isteqlal or Celebration of Independence Day (August 19), Loya Jirga 
or the Great Assembly, Eid’ul-Fitr (the three-day celebration that takes place after 
Ramadan), Eid’ ul-Adha (the three-day Sacrifice Celebration), and Nawruz (New Year’s 
Day, March 21
st
 in Afghanistan). In order to understand the proceedings of these 
symbolic ceremonies and how they were used by the Afghan state to symbolize 
Afghanistan and what kind of people attended and where the ceremonies took place, one 
of Jashan-e Isteqlal’s ceremonies is thoroughly explored here.  
The 1928 celebration of Jashan-e Isteqlal was commemorated as Amanullah 
Khan returned to Afghanistan following an eight month trip abroad where he went to 
symbolize Afghanistan in the world. Amanullah’s trip will be first explored and through 
it, the Jashan-e Isteqlal of 1928.  Amanullah’s visits of India, Egypt, Germany, and 
Russia are thoroughly explored. The main reason behind this is because a full discussion 
of Amanullah’s trip needs more time and space, which are limited in this thesis.  
Amanullah traveled to various countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe. However, 
Amanullah and his delegation visited, saw something, and did something in every 
following cities, seas, and ports of Asia, Africa, and Europe where they traveled to and 
from: Kabul, Ghazni, Muqor, and Qandahar cities in Afghanistan; Quetta, Karachi, and 
Bombay in British India; SS Rajputana, the Passenger Carrier Ship in the Arabian Sea; 
Ports of Aden and Said in Yemen and Egypt; Cairo in Egypt; Naples, Rome, Vatican, and 
Milan in Italy; Paris, Leon, and Lyon in France; Brussels in Belgium; Zurich and Geneva 
                                                                                                                                                                             
government employees of both the military and civilian administrations gathered. “The people of 
Farah,” Tulu-e Afghan reported, “thanked the Afghan students for studying in Europe, wished 
them success, and were grateful for Emir Amanullah Khan.” See the full article, “Maref 
Khawhay’ha-e Farah: Educational Support of Farah,” Tulu-e Afghan, 2nd Year, No. 1 (1922), p. 2.  
86 
 
 
 
in Switzerland; Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden in Germany; London, Birmingham, 
Manchester, and Ireland in the United Kingdom; Warsaw in Poland; Minsk in Belarus; 
Leningrad (now, St. Petersburg), Moscow, Kiev, and Crimea Tatars in Soviet Union; 
Black Sea, Istanbul, and Ankara in Turkey; Tbilisi, and Baku in Soviet Union again; 
Caspian Sea, Rasht, and Tehran in Iran; and Herat, Farah, Qandahar, Muqor, Ghazni, and 
Kabul in Afghanistan. 
(Figure 15, Amanullah’s Approximate Trip Routes, 1927-1928) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part Two: Externally Symbolized Afghanistan 
Between 1919 and 1929, one of the main objectives of the Afghan nationalists 
was to sell and symbolize Afghanistan abroad. The new flags, the new medals, the new 
schools, and the new roshanfekran or the elites who by now made a well-composed class 
of diplomats, writers, poets, and government employees had to become “serviceable and 
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useful to the country and nation so that the Government and nation of Afghanistan may 
make a name and gain great renown in the civilized world and take its proper place 
among the civilized Powers of the world.”148Among the “civilized Powers of the world,” 
Russia was the first to recognize Afghanistan as an independent sovereign country in 
1919 when Afghanistan’s War of Independence, known also as the Third Anglo-Afghan 
War, ended. After Russia, several other countries followed. According to Mir Ghulam 
Mohammad Ghobar, who himself became a symbol and also symbolizer of Afghanistan-e 
jadid or new Afghanistan in the 1920s and 1930s, the Government of Afghanistan 
established diplomatic relationships with nine foreign countries between 1919 and 
1928.
149
 These countries were Iran, Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, France, Poland, 
Switzerland, Liberia, and Japan. In addition to these nine, Afghan Government signed a 
treaty with Italy in 1921 and several treaties with Turkey in the 1920s. They sent a 
delegation to the United States too, however; the United States did not establish 
diplomatic relationships until the late 1930s.
150
  
The mega effect of recognition of Afghanistan as a sovereign state by foreign 
countries happened when Amanullah Khan as a sovereign oriental monarch visited 
Europe. Although Amanullah’s trip is remotely studied and widely popularized by the 
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 Amanullah’s Proclamation; available in Ludwig Adamec, Afghanistan, 1900-1923: A 
Diplomatic History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 212.  
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 Ghobar (1987), 789.  Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar (1897-1978) was a prominent 
Afghan historian whose book Afghanistan dar masir-e tarikh or Afghanistan in the Course of 
History that was first published in 1967 remained one of the very important historical works in 
Afghanistan. It was Ghobar who invented the title Ahmad Shah Baba-ye Afghan or Ahmad Shah 
the Father of Afghans in 1932. Since then Ghobar’s invention, Ahmad Shah who is identified by 
historians of Afghanistan as the founder of the country is referred to as father of Afghans.  
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 For a useful discussion of Afghanistan’s Foreign Relations between 19101-1929, see 
Adamec (1967). 
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Afghan historical narratives,
151
 there is not yet available a careful and satisfactory 
explanation of the trip’s complexity, its significance, and its implication for nationalism 
in Afghanistan. Therefore, the hope is that this chapter will shed some lights on the trip’s 
complexity, significance, and implication for nationalism in Afghanistan.  
From the departure of Amanullah and his delegation from Kabul to their arrival 
back to Kabul, everything related to and happened during and in the trip had a special 
significance to the Afghan nationalists: Amanullah was representing an independent 
nation, Afghanistan. Even before leaving Kabul, the Afghan state had already planned a 
grand farewell ceremony for Amanullah and his delegation. On November 29, 1927, 
Amanullah gathered about 12,000 people in the newly built palace, Del Kusha or Heart’s 
Delight where he offered his farewell statement. The people present at the event were 
civilian and military personnel including students from the various schools of Kabul. 
Some of the people were brought as far as six kilometer away from Kabul city. In the 
ceremonial speech, Amanullah downplayed the existence of several diverse ethnic 
communities in Afghanistan. He rather impressed upon people that they were all Afghans 
without regards to what ethnic and tribal group to which they belonged. “Afghanistan did 
not have,” Amanullah stated, “ethnic and tribal communities such as Hindu, Hazara, 
Shia, Sunni, Ahmadzai, and Popalzai. Afghans are all one people, and that is Afghan.” 
This farewell statement was reported to be emotional and apparently made Amanullah 
and the attendees to cry several times.
 152
 After talking about the importance of 
independence of Afghanistan and the necessity of the trip to introduce Afghanistan to the 
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world and saying-goodbye to the people, he and his delegation left Kabul to Quetta, then 
the Afghanistan’s southern border town between the country and British India 
Amanullah Khan’s World Tour: India, Egypt, and Europe 
Once Amanullah and his delegation crossed Afghanistan’s border and took the 
British-provided railway from Quetta towards port cities of India, Karachi and Bombay, 
his trip became more political, more nationalistic, and above all, more symbolic. While in 
Bombay, he did not only symbolize himself as an “Afghan monarch” but he also 
preached Pan-Islamism and nationalism. In Bombay, from December 12, 1927 until 
December 17, he had several official dinners with the senior British colonial officials in 
India including the city’s governor. He and his delegation also toured the city; visited 
several Indian Muslim mosques, associations, and schools; and above all, met in person 
and communicated through letters with the Afghan diasporic community of Bombay, 
Pathans of India, Turkic-Perso community of Qizilbashes, and Indian Parsees’ 
community.
153
  
For Pan-Islamic outreach, the Indian Muslims’ Khilafat Movement that sought 
Pan-Islamic Unity after the decline of the Ottoman Empire as the seat of Khilafat 
organized a special event for Amanullah on Friday December 16, 1927. Amanullah was 
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 The Turkic Qizilbash Community was partly a military, partly a civilian, and partly a 
religious Turkic group who were brought to Afghanistan and India during the seventieth century 
when the Perso-Turkic King, Nader Shah Afshar (r. 1736-1747) campaigned there. As they were 
important in Iran, the Qizilbashes later played very important role in making and unmaking of 
Afghan Kings, and administration of the state. In his meeting with the Qizilbashes community in 
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Historically, Qizilbashes are introduced by historians as “King-makers.” See for the importance 
of Qizilbashes Stephen Dale, The Muslims Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 253-258. 
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scheduled to speak for nearly 3,000 people who had gathered in a large open area. They 
had a chair placed in the middle of the venue where Amanullah was asked to sit. Then, 
each representative from the Khilafat Movement read their speech, and praised 
Amanullah Khan, Padsha-e Isteqlal Bakhsha-e Afghanistan or the king and giver of 
Afghanistan’s independence. The Muslims of India stated that Amanullah “is not only the 
young, brave, and ghazi king of Afghans, not only wants independence and progress of 
his valiant nation but he was also a person who wants independence, unity, and progress 
of all Muslims. We call upon him as it is also his desires to ask for independence and 
rights of all Muslims, and we all believe in his spiritual and thoughtful ability to do 
so.”154  
When the speeches of Indian Muslims were finished, Amanullah stood and 
delivered a Pan-Islamic speech (in Persian via an Urdu translator) in which he asked for 
unity, brotherhood, education, and support among Muslims. After the event, Amanullah 
went back to his residence in the Government House of Bombay, and within hour after 
the lunch, Amanullah appeared back in Bombay’s Grand Friday Mosque where he 
offered the Friday Khutbah, the sermon and led the prayers.
155
  
However, in contrast to the Pan-Islamic importance of Amanullah’s meetings 
with Muslims of India, his meeting with “Afghans of Bombay” and “Pathans of India” 
makes his stay in India more interesting and more nationalistic. One day before his 
meeting with the Muslims of India, the Afghans who were residing in Bombay had 
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 For Amanullah’s interaction and activities with and among the Muslims of Bombay 
and India, see pages 41-46 and 48-51 of Popalzai (1986). After meeting with the Khilafat 
Movement and leading the Friday Prayer, Amanullah also had an all-afternoon session with the 
“Islamic Association of Bombay.” See Ibid.  
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arranged a special evening with Amanullah and his delegation in the Afghan Consulate. It 
was at this three-hour meeting that Amanullah asked Afghans who were residing in India 
to take Afghan passports and tazkaras in order to become Afghan citizens so that they 
could not be branded wrongly “as Turks and Iranian.” During the meeting, Amanullah 
talks about Afghanistan’s independence and reforms, and their importance to Afghans 
both inside and outside Afghanistan.  He told the Afghans in India:  
If Afghanistan was not the name of a holy homeland, I would have not been respected 
and honored by anybody. The Indian brothers and the Government of India would have 
not honored me this much. You cannot depend on anybody, except your God and your 
holy watan, homeland. If you are away from your homeland, what do you need: God and 
country? You have both. Obey Him first. Although this advice is unnecessary because I 
have heard that Afghans are increasingly getting closer and consolidated, I still ask you to 
do good and be good towards people, make clean deals, do good so much that people 
would not take you to courts…..Although I can recognize from your harsh eyes, unhappy 
foreheads, and your black eyebrows that you are Afghans, not everybody knows you. 
Therefore, get yourself passport and tazkara……this is a necessity that the entire world 
have gotten it. You also get it…. Sacrifice for your country….and I am thankful for God 
that Afghans are healthy, courageous, and patriotic. I ask God to have you dignified and 
exalted. Long Live our Dear Afghanistan.
156
 
 
In addition to his meeting with Afghans in Bombay, Amanullah exchanged letters 
with Muslims of Rohila. It is studied that Muslims of Rohila are considered to be of 
Afghans’ descendants. It is argued that the communities of Pashtuns-Pathans-or Afghans 
who lived (and live) in India were the Afghans who spread throughout South Asia before 
the establishment of the modern state of Afghanistan in the eighteenth century. These 
Afghans traveled there for trade or they were part of the military expeditions of the 
Muslim rulers. Although they integrated themselves with the cosmopolitan environment 
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of India, they kept their Afghan tribal and religious identity through tazkara or 
genealogy. 
157
  
In their letter to Amanullah Khan, the Muslims of Rohila expressed their support 
to him and his nationalism programs for Afghanistan. According to Popalzai (1986), in 
1920 when Mahmud Tarzi then the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan went to India to 
settle the final negotiations of the peace treaty of 1919 with the British, he was informed 
by the Muslims of Rohila that the “border” between Afghanistan and British India had to 
be “Rohila, a land that is in reality a part of Afghanistan but located in Hindustan.” 158  
After touring the city of Bombay including its municipality, attending an air 
show, leading a Friday Prayer in the Bombay’s Grand Mosque, meeting with Afghans of 
Bombay, and exchanging letters with Muslims of Rohila, Amanullah and his delegation 
boarded the SS Rajputana, the British Passenger Carrier Ship. They traveled through the 
great Arabian Sea and on December 21, after a four-day trip via the Arabian Sea the 
Rajputana, arrived in the Port of Aden where Sir Francis Henry, the British envoy to 
Kabul who was accompanying Amanullah and his delegation, had already planned the 
activities of Amanullah and his delegation. In Aden, he was met by the British Colonial 
officials of Port Aden and the Governor of Aden.
159
  
From Aden, Rajputana traveled to Port Said in Egypt where Amanullah was 
greeted by Fuad I, King of Egypt, and Governor and the Head of Police of Suez. From 
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watches a boxing match in the ship, see Ibid, 58-62.  
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there they went to Cairo by train.  He was welcomed in Cairo by a cheering crowd that 
the government had assembled. Amanullah, the Padsha-e Isteqlal Bakhsha-e 
Afghanistan, with a reputation as Pan-Islamist, anti-colonial and nationalist calls was well 
received in Egypt where Egyptian nationalism was in a critical period.  The struggle for 
full self-determination against the British and their desire to modernize further provided 
similarities between Afghanistan and Egypt.  However, this interaction of Egyptian 
nationalism and nationalism in Afghanistan did not convey the fact that Egypt has been 
far earlier impacted by the intellectual and material ideas of the Europeans dates back to 
the 1790s invasion by Napoleon.  Egyptian reforms of Muhammad Ali and his successors 
in 1800s until its occupation by the British in 1882 presented a history of nationalism in 
Egypt. Yet, according to the Egyptian nationalists, the difference between Egypt and 
Afghanistan was that Afghanistan, as a Muslim country, was free and independent from 
colonialism while Egypt was not. Popalzai (1986) writes that on December 24, a day 
before Amanullah arrived in Egypt, Egypt’s second oldest newspaper, Al-Ahram or the 
Pyramids had an article about Amanullah’s and his delegation’s arrival to the country.  
The newspaper’s report read as follows: “O’ you people who seek independence! O’ you 
people who love freedom. O’ you people who call for the independence of people. 
Tomorrow, in your homeland, the independent king is going to arrive. The courageous 
Afghan who admires independence, freedom, and the desires of people, then, honor and 
admire him.” 160  
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During his thirteen-day stay in Egypt, in addition to all formalities of the politics 
and diplomacy that took place between Fuad I and Amanullah, the Afghan ruler also did 
a number of symbolic activities that intended to represent Afghanistan in Egypt and 
beyond.
161
 For instance, to learn about the modernization or nationalism of Egypt, 
Amanullah and his delegation visited almost all of the popular established symbols of 
Egypt such as Museum of Egypt, the Pyramids, National Bank of Egypt, Ministry of 
Education, Egyptian Library of Cairo, and several primary, secondary and higher 
educational institutions of Cairo including Al-Azhar. They even went to see both the old 
and new parts of Cairo where new roads and new houses had been built.
162
 Additionally, 
Amanullah was invited to attend one of the sessions of Egypt’s Parliament, and held a 
grand meeting with the members of Egyptian Media. In both of these sessions, the talks 
were about the Islamic unity, anti-colonialism, and progress of the Muslim nations.
163
 On 
January 6 of 1928 when Amanullah’s thirteen-day visit finished in Egypt, he embarked 
an Italian passenger ship in Alexandria from where he started his tour of Europe.  
Naples was the first port of entry for Amanullah in Europe. He and his delegation 
traveled to nine European countries that included Italy, France, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Germany, United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and Soviet Union. For the narrative in this 
work, no one country will be highlighted over the other.  Rather, his trip to Europe will 
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dinners, visiting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and other activities, see Ibid 71-72. 
162
 Apparently, when Gamal Abdel Nasser came to Afghanistan on April 1955, he is 
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be discussed as a European trip rather than an Italian or French or Russian or English 
one.
164
  
The European tour had a number of symbolic meanings for Amanullah, for the 
Afghan nationalists, for the pan-Islamic Muslims, and for the European themselves. For 
the Europeans, Amanullah himself becomes a symbol. In each of the countries and 
particular cities that he visited, the official and public understanding was the arrival of a 
modern progressive Oriental monarch with his wife and delegation to Europe—a 
continent that was itself recovering from its major inter-imperial and inter-European war, 
World War One.  
Amanullah was not the first Oriental monarch to have gone on a European State 
visit. In 1867, Khedive Ismail of Egypt was invited by Napoleon III to visit France where 
he toured the Exposition Universelle. When the Khedive came back, he tried to build 
large open boulevards like Paris in Cairo and implement other symbols and innovations 
similar to those he observed in France. In 1873 Naser al-Din Shah of Persia toured 
Europe where he saw the symbols of Europe’s urbanate infrastructure. When he came 
back to Iran, he tried to make Tehran, Persia’s capital, like Paris. Amanullah’s 
grandfather, Abdur Rahman (r. 1880-1901) wished to travel at least once to the United 
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the discussion.  
96 
 
 
 
Kingdom/Europe. However, he never made it, though his son and Amanullah’s uncle, 
Nasirullah Khan, traveled to London in 1895.
165
  
Each of the countries in Europe where Amanullah Khan went tried to take 
advantage of his visit and use it as some-kind of a diplomatic symbol in order to increase 
their inter-European and post-World War One political and imperial status. For example, 
on April 29, 1928 when Amanullah arrived in Poland, which had become an independent 
nation-state in 1918 after a century and half rule and “partition” by imperial powers, 
Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Prussia, the visit was highlighted by the host country as 
evidence of their newly won sovereignty of the nation-states.
166
 In France, for example, 
the French government used the royal visit to show its glory and hospitality as a 
European power.  It is recorded that the government removed from Musée du Louvre 
Napoleon’s bed and offered it to Amanullah to sleep in it because the French had said to 
Amanullah “we want you to be comfortable on this bed.” However, the report continues 
that Amanullah did not accept it, and replied: “I am a soldier. My ancestors during 
Napoleon’s time were also soldiers, and like me they also lived in discomforting and 
difficult situations.”167 When Amanullah refuses to sleep on Napoleon’s bed, it surprises 
the French so much, as the story goes, that they symbolize him as Napoleon by saying 
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that “Napoleon of the East at this time is this person. He should sleep in Napoleon’s bed 
since he came to his country as guest.”168 Apart from this symbolization the French praise 
Amanullah’s reforms back in Afghanistan. During the speeches, they remind him that it 
was under him that Afghan students were sent abroad for studying and it was Amanullah 
who thought about opening up Afghanistan’s doors to the outside world and admired his 
appreciation of the material progress of Europe. A large number of Afghan students lived 
in France at the time of Amanullah’s visit. France had also an exclusive right in the 
discovery of Afghanistan’s ancient symbols as well. In 1922, Afghanistan granted 
France’s archeologists an exclusive right to look for Afghanistan’s ancient historical 
symbols and societies. Their researches and findings of Afghanistan’s past became so 
symbolically important for Afghan nationalists, and some of the nationalists were taught 
and educated by the French. One of such persons was Ahmad Ali Kohzad (1907-1983), 
who was educated by the French Archeological Delegation to Afghanistan. Kohzad and 
Afghan historians used the findings of Afghanistan’s past by French scholars in late 
1920s, early 1930s, and 1940s to construct a modern national history of Afghanistan’s 
ancient, medieval, and contemporary times. 
Amanullah’s progressive view was praised throughout his stay in France. During 
his visit of Paris Municipality, the city’s mayor described the Afghan monarch as “the 
enlightened monarch and a lover of progress. Paris is happy to host such a firm and 
steady monarch, who from the onset to the throne in Afghanistan had shown friendly 
signs to our country. Your visit of us has made us happier. Your noble country 
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Afghanistan, which only brings good and no harm to us, is the champion of the Orient. At 
one time, around the name of Alexander the Great, there were shared commonalities of 
civilization.”169 
In addition to the symbolization of Amanullah as the Napoleon of the East and 
reminding him of Afghanistan’s ancient history, the French arranged for him to visit 
many of the French national symbols so that he could remember France’s achievements 
while visiting other European countries. Amanullah visited University of Paris; France 
National Library; National Museum, Louvre; France’s Military Academy in Saint-Cyr; 
and Allied Club in Paris. Additionally, Amanullah was invited by Paris’ Orientalists to 
speak for them. In the Paris Orientalist club, they served Amanullah “only tea,” the 
symbol of the Orient.
170
 He also visited several schools in France including Lycee 
Michelet where Afghan students (and among them, Prince Hedayatullah Khan) were 
studying.
171
 
 Like the French who used Amanullah to impress him and his delegation of the 
achievements of France as a European power, and the Poles who used him to further their 
cause of independence in a shaky and unstable post-World War One Europe, other 
European heads of state and monarchs used Amanullah as well. Germany that was using 
all symbols and possibilities available to recover her losses of World War One and to find 
ways to pay the post-war reparations tried to use Amanullah’s visit to boost its diplomatic 
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status as a power in Europe and beyond.
172
 Germans arranged for Amanullah and his 
delegation to attend several official state-dinners. They also arranged for him to visit air 
shows, several warfare factories, and Berlin’s Municipality. During his visit of Technical 
University of Berlin, he was granted an honorary doctorate for being “a progressive, 
conscious, and peace-loving king of Afghanistan who had really and meaningfully gained 
the right of a doctorate and professorship in the modernization of human 
civilization.”173Additionally, Amanullah visited many other cities of Germany such as 
Potsdam, Leipzig, and Dresden where he went to see particularly the warfare factories. 
As he did in Paris, he also toured Berlin’s Museum, Library, and met in person in several 
occasions with Afghan students who were studying in Germany. 
174
 
 Like France and Germany where Amanullah and his delegation became symbols 
of modernity, progressivism, and reforms, the United Kingdom and Soviet Union tried 
also to use Amanullah and his delegation. In the United Kingdom, in addition to his 
official diplomatic meetings and attending air shows, he took flights over London city. 
Furthermore, even though Afghanistan is a landlocked country and has no use for 
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submarines, Amanullah was granted such a tour. He also visited British Museum and 
library and traveled to several other cities across the United Kingdom. In addition to the 
doctorate degree that he received in Germany, the Oxford University honored him with a 
second honorary doctorate degree; this time the degree was in law. And finally, as the 
French had symbolized him as the Napoleon of the East by the French, Amanullah was 
praised by the British who compared the Afghan ruler to Peter the Great of Russia 
because of his reforms.
175
  
Unlike Western European countries where Amanullah was symbolized as a 
modern progressive oriental monarch, in the Soviet Union he was introduced as an anti-
imperialist statesman who freed Afghanistan from the imperial domination of Britain. In 
the Soviet Union, his visit was symbolized more as an anti-colonialist and less as a 
nationalist. After arriving in Moscow on May 4, 1928, Amanullah had official dinners 
with the Soviet Union leaders including the president, then Mikhail Kalinin.  During the 
dinner address, the Soviet President mentioned that Soviet Union was “proud and happy 
to recall that it was the first government to recognize the new government of 
Afghanistan, and became happy as the country became independent.”176  
Amanullah toured the Kremlin. He attended a horse race tournament—an 
occasion the Soviets named it Independent Afghanistan.
177
 In addition, Amanullah toured 
an “Afghan Military Exhibition,” which was held in the Red Army’s headquarter where 
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there was a sign that read: “Long Live Afghanistan’s Independence.” In the exhibition, 
there were Afghan symbols that were brought from Kabul Afghanistan. According to 
Popalzai (1986), the symbols were “maps of Anglo-Afghan Wars, maps and copies of 
treaties, Afghan military outfits, Amanullah’s decrees including his decree that banned 
slavery in Afghanistan, and pictures of Afghan military generals and Kabul that showed 
the new city, Darul Aman.” In addition to the military exhibition, there was also 
“Afghanistan Press Exhibition” where articles and publications of Russian press and 
Afghan Press were put to display.
178
  
The visit to the Soviet Union and the other European countries ended on May 16, 
1928 when the king and his delegation traveled via a southern route from Moscow 
towards the Crimea and Black Sea and entered Turkey. Amanullah’s European visits had 
multiple symbolic meanings. The Europeans used and manipulated Amanullah and his 
delegation as a symbol in the post-World War One state of affairs. Amanullah also took 
advantage of his trip. He used his trip in every European country to symbolize 
Afghanistan as an independent nation in the world that was still divided among and 
dominated by the European imperial powers. Therefore, in Europe, Amanullah’s trip 
became symbolically important for Afghan nationalists and significant for Islamic 
nationalists in demonstrating the new pan-Islamic anti-colonial nationalism. This was at 
least the impression of nationalists and the press, anti-colonialists, and pan-Islamists in 
Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, and India.  
                                                          
178
 Ibid, 200-201.  
102 
 
 
 
Take for example the report of Captain Wickham, the Military Attaché of the 
British Legation in Kabul from where he wrote to London his impression about how 
Amanullah’s trip was received by the Afghans and Iranians: “The Aman-i Afghan,” wrote 
Captain Wickham, “has published an extract from the Persian newspaper Sitarah-i Iran, 
dealing with the king’s visit to the Pope in Rome. In this article emphasis is laid on the 
fact that the King departed from the usual custom of kissing the Pope’s hand. In the 
writer’s opinion, King Amanullah by his action has proved to the world the greatness of 
modern Islamic nations and the fact that they are equal to European nations. This very 
illogical article concludes with the sentence: The Pope, who outwardly has nothing to do 
with politics, has obviously realized this point (i.e., greatness of the modern Islamic 
world), and it would be much better if the politicians of Europe would understand it 
too.”179 In addition to Aman-e Afghan, other newspapers of Afghanistan covered the trip 
from country to country where Amanullah and his delegation traveled. 
180
 
 Amanullah’s pan-Islamic nationalism and modernism calls were received well in 
Turkey where he and his delegation arrived from Soviet Union. Turkish nationalists 
including Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were already aware of Amanullah’s state-building 
efforts in Afghanistan where Turkish teachers and military officers were hired to train the 
Afghan forces. When Tawfiq Big, Turkish Minister to Soviet Union, was interviewed in 
Moscow about Amanullah’s visit to Turkey, he replied that “Afghanistan and Turkey 
were friendly and brotherly countries…. the Afghan nation is progressing through the 
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educational programs of Amanullah Shah Ghazi. Amanullah Shah is a big person, and his 
works are for the good of his own nation. In Turkey, there will be a very celebratory and 
warm welcome for His Majesty the King of Afghanistan.”181 After meeting Ataturk and 
going through all of the diplomatic formalities and statements, Amanullah and his 
delegation went to Istanbul where they spent a week. Since they could not go to Iran 
through Turkish borders because of some disputes between Turks and Iranians, he took 
the Asia Minor route where they went first to Tbilisi and then to Baku in Azerbaijan. 
From there via the Caspian Sea, they arrived in Iran.
182
 The visit in Iran was short. Since 
Afghanistan had (and has) a large Shia community that had religious and cultural 
connections with the religious and cultural sites and institutions in Iran, Reza Shah 
Pahlavi, the Iranian ruler suggested to Amanullah during his visit of Iran to “allow 
Afghan Shias to have freedom in celebrating their religious rituals.” It is said that 
Amanullah replied to Reza Shah that “all Afghans have equal rights without regards to 
their religious sects.”183 
 From Iran, Amanullah and his delegation enters into Herat, Afghanistan’s western 
province. Once Amanullah’s and his delegation tour ended in the foreign countries, it was 
now the turn to Afghanistan where Amanullah and his delegation had already arranged 
the preparations to propagate and symbolize the trip to Afghan people. In Herat, which 
was having its summer season in June of 1928, Amanullah did not stay for more than a 
night because the weather was hot. Upon his arrival in Herat and in his honor and safe 
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return, thirteen cannons were fired. From Herat, the trip took an eastern route towards 
Qandahar, Muqor, and Ghazni. To symbolize and propagate effectively the arrival of the 
king, a twenty-four member Reception Committee was created in Kabul. The committee 
made sure that on the king’s route to Kabul, in each stop—Farah, Qandahar, Muqor, and 
Ghazni—triumphal arches were to be erected and covered with Afghanistan’s flags. 
Every city where the king was to arrive had to be illuminated and kept clean. In every 
city, all of the government employees, both civilian and military personnel as well as the 
district and provincial governors, students and teachers, and the mayor, had to be present 
to welcome the king. In the provincial capital during the first night of the arrival, the 
governor had to arrange an official dinner for the king and his delegation. The Governor 
of Kabul along with fifty students, military commanders of Kabul Corps, and two 
military divisions had to be present in Muqor and Ghazni where they were assigned to 
welcome the king, and have arranged two planes to sprinkle flowers and escort the king 
and his delegation to Kabul.  
In Kabul the government employees, students and teachers both female and male, 
and the mayor were assembled in lines from Dehmazang until Qasr-e Del Kusha to 
welcoming back the king. The city was symbolized with Afghanistan’s flags and was 
illuminated for three days and three nights. The first three days of the king’s arrival were 
announced as national Eid holiday. Representatives were invited from all the provinces to 
Kabul in order to welcome and honor the king. The Kabul Government, Municipality and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged official banquets and entertainments for the first 
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four days upon the king’s arrival. The religious leaders and mullahs were rewarded for 
the king’s safe return.184  
When Amanullah’s departure to and arrival from abroad were signified as a 
‘national’ symbol of Afghanistan-e jadid/nawa-e Afghanistan or the new Afghanistan, he 
himself was now more than ever committed to celebrate that symbol. After a month and 
half in Kabul, where he and his delegation arrived on July 1, 1928, Kabul was now soon 
to celebrate another grand symbolic event: the annual symbol, Jashan-e Isteqlal or the 
Independence Day on August 19. This year’s Jashan-e Isteqlal, however, was in so many 
ways different from the previous ones. First, this year’s Jashan was planned to coincide 
with another symbol of Afghanistan, which in theory and also practice supersedes all 
symbols of Afghanistan. This was the grand assembly or Loya Jirga of 1928. Loya Jirga 
is a problematic but important institution in Afghanistan.  Jirga, if to look at it locally and 
culturally, means assembly or gathering or meeting. In this local context, Jirga has a non-
political, non-hegemonic, and non-militaristic purpose. It is usually used by the local 
Afghans to resolve their local and community problems. However, when it comes to 
Loya Jirga or Grand Assembly, it takes a political, hegemonic, and militaristic purpose 
because the Afghan state has been using Loya Jirga to produce legitimacy in the national 
and international levels.
185
 The second difference of this year’s Jashan was because of 
the king’s return from abroad, and the new symbols he had brought with himself. 
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According to Ronald Wide, the British journalist who attended 1928’s Jashan-e 
Isteqlal, Amanullah was ready to symbolize this year’s Jashan-e Isteqlal with more joy 
and new symbols as he had learned about them from traveling abroad. “Three days before 
the annual celebration of Independence Day, August 1928,” wrote Wide, “great things 
were expected when that day dawned. The king was to speak, and it was thought that he 
would have something further to say of the programme for his kingdom. He would detail 
the events of the past few months [about his trip], and tell the delegates to his annual 
jirga, or meeting, of the honours that had been heaped upon him in all the cities of the 
West.”186  
As matter of fact, his trip abroad had already turned into a symbol—a series of 
films—which were shown for three consecutive weeks in the newly opened cinema—a 
symbol of modernization that Amanullah brought to Afghanistan from abroad. Who 
watched exactly the films is not clear. However, there is a high chance that the audience 
of the films was the Afghan government employees and other officials.
187
  In addition to 
the display of the films and tennis tournaments, which were running consecutively days 
before this year’s Jashan-e Isteqlal, the venue of this year’s jashan was even different 
from its usual place. This year it was to be celebrated in Paghman, a foothill valley about 
12 miles northwest of Kabul where Amanullah was born and where there now was 
standing a triumphal arch, Takhta-e Zafar similar to that of Arc de Triumph in Paris. 
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Takhta-e Zafar was built to celebrate Afghanistan’s fallen men who fought during the 
Third Anglo-Afghan War, known also as War of Independence in 1919.
188
  
What is more interesting than takhat-e zafar to observe of this year’s Jashan-e 
Isteqlal’s is the range of several other activities, which had symbolic meanings to 
Amanullah and the Afghan nationalists. In addition to having invited the diplomats of 
several countries to observe the symbols of Afghanistan in Paghman, Amanullah invited 
a German Mobile Opera company to play in Paghman. The company, was initially first 
invited by the British colonial government in Peshawar, however, the Afghan state 
arranged for them to come to Afghanistan for the Jashan as well. According to Wild 
(1933), who was present in the Jashan, the opera’s actors were a German Jew and his 
wife, a South African Dutch. Their son and daughter, one born in Paris and the other in 
South America, were in the cast. There was a husband of the daughter, a New Yorker, 
and an additional property man who was distinctly Italian. For Amanullah it was 
important to symbolize not only Afghanistan in Afghanistan but in the world. 
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“Appropriately,” wrote Wild, “it seemed the international atmosphere of the new 
Afghanistan was being maintained” by having invited foreign diplomats in the Jashan 
and playing for them Western opera in an oriental land.
189
  
But still more interesting this year’s Jashan was to see the fruitfulness of the 
educational reforms that the Afghan state had undertaken in Kabul and beyond in the 
country.  Now, during the Jashan, the students could easily symbolize themselves, the 
king, and the Afghan nation. As part of many symbolic activities that were arranged for 
the Jashan, a combined group of 98 students were collected from several schools of 
Kabul to prove to Amanullah that he could be confident that Afghanistan had now a well-
composed class of citizens who could represent the country at-home and abroad. Out of 
these 98 students, 95 of them represented Afghanistan’s first educational symbol, 
Habibya College. The 95 students from Habibya were divided into four groups, 20, 20, 
20, and 25. The first 20-student group had to collectively read aloud for “His Majesty the 
King,” their article, Khair-e Maqdam Isteqlal or the Beginning of Independence.190 The 
second 20-student group of Habibya also had their article read aloud, which was about 
the praise of Amanullah’s works for Afghanistan: “Shah Ghazi emir Amanullah Khan: de 
adel-aqel-amel-kamel; mulke-mahkam de qawi de Afghanistan; wurka isteqlal watan ta 
padshah: kamal-jamal-jalal-afzal—Amanullah, the just, wise, doer, and accomplisher; 
Afghanistan is the strong homeland; the king has given the homeland independence; 
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Amanullah: his accomplishment, magnificence, majesty, and excellence.”191 And the 
third group, fourth group, and other students continued, individually, with their articles 
read aloud in front of and to the king and the audience. Each student had individual 
articles assigned on a different subject. For example, one had written his article on “the 
importance of chemistry,” another on “structure of sentences in English,” another on 
“Turkish Language,” another on the “geography of Kabul,” another on “Pashtu 
language,” and so on many other subjects.  
When Jashan-e Isteqlal of 1928 was ended after a week of celebration and 
symbolization of Afghanistan where now a European opera could play and tennis 
tournament could be held, “Amanullah was pleased…. [and was] congratulated.” wrote 
Wild. “His country [Amanullah thought],” Wild continued, “was already civilized.”192 
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(Figure, 16: Amanullah Speaking in Jashan-e Isteqlal 1928 in Paghman) 
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(Figure, 17: Amanullah’s brother, Enayatullah Khan, left with the white coat and crossing legs, 
during the Tennis Tournament in Paghman) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Conclusion 
Nationalism in Afghanistan: A Colonial, Elite Idea 
As it was discussed in the four chapters of this thesis, nationalism in Afghanistan was 
a colonial idea, and the Afghan nationalists or roshanfekran such as Mahmud Tarzi or 
Amanullah Khan or Mir Ghulam M. Ghobar adapted and adopted this idea into an 
Afghan idea. Using a post-modernist analysis of nationalism, this thesis argued that the 
definition of an Afghan nation and therefore the subsequent nationalism in Afghanistan 
were colonial constructs. Its foundation, such as the boundaries of Afghanistan, was 
territorialized and mapped by colonial activities in the nineteenth century. Before the 
colonial construction of Afghanistan, the country that is now known as Afghanistan did 
not have any existence. Of course, like many other countries in the region, the modern 
territory of Afghanistan and its people the Afghans were part of the sociopolitical 
communities that existed in the region and the Afghans interacted with the wider world. 
However, the ancientness of the modern territory of Afghanistan does not necessarily 
institute, as the Afghan nationalists claimed, an Afghanistan that was always 
“Afghanistan.” 
What made the modern nation of Afghanistan were a set of convergent facts that were 
associated with the colonial activities and efforts in the nineteenth century. Some of these 
colonial activities that were discussed in this thesis were Mountstuart Elphinstone 
Mission 1808-1809 and his book An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul (1815); the 
colonial wars such as the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the Battle of Maiwand (1878-
1880), and the colonial treaties such as the Anglo-Russian Negotiations of 1873. These 
colonial activities constructed the very foundation of nationalism in Afghanistan. This 
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foundation was the name, territory, and history of Afghanistan. They were constructed, 
labeled, and defined by the power of colonial knowledge, especially the British.  
The traditional explanation of the studies of nationalism in Afghanistan is hegemonic. 
This is so because the story represents the narrative of the role of great men such as 
Habibullah Khan, Mahmud Tarzi, Amanullah Khan, and other Afghan personalities of 
the period. Habibullah is praised for his initiation of small but important reforms in 
Afghanistan and his son Amanullah is depicted as the champion of nationalism in 
Afghanistan because of his exceptional modernist reforms in an inward-looking 
conservative society. The Afghan state’s reforms, which were an imitation of the 
colonial-European sociopolitical institutions, allowed people such as Ghobar to foster a 
national idea that Afghanistan was an ancient country; its old names were Ariana and 
Khurasan; and Afghan people had their own territory, culture, and history. That is why, 
above all, Ghobar was successful in inventing the idea of Baba-ye Afghan, designating 
Ahmad Shah Abdali-Durrani, the so-called founder of Afghanistan, as the father of 
Afghans.  
This national idea was propagated in the hegemonic institutions of the state. 
Institutions such as army, bureaucracy, and the education system provided avenues to the 
propagation. Especially, the education system, which was discussed in this thesis, was the 
key for the propagation of a national idea. For schools such as Habibya College, the first 
modern secular school in Afghanistan, the Afghan state created a modern state-
sanctioned curriculum in which a national idea was propagated through subjects such as 
“history of Afghanistan,” “geography of Afghanistan,” and “literature of Afghanistan.” 
114 
 
 
 
Additionally, the new state-sanctioned curriculum established a new kind of organization 
of the schools, which emphasized order, discipline, and compliance. Once these schools 
were established and were able to produce a well-composed patronized class of elites for 
the Afghan state, these institutions were used to symbolize Afghanistan at-home and 
abroad. Amanullah and his delegation, for example, in their eight-month tour of Asia and 
Europe did not only symbolize Afghanistan, but they also themselves became symbol of 
the country. 
The study of nationalism in Afghanistan has not yet addressed the relationship 
between those who promoted nationalism ideas, and those who consumed nationalism 
ideas in Afghanistan. Many Afghans were illiterate in the period between 1901 and 1929 
when the newspapers, such as Siraj al-Akhbar or its successor Aman-e Afghan, appeared. 
Nationalistic ideas such as the concepts of nationality, nationhood, and modernity were 
propagated by newspapers and Afghan nationalists. However, whether or not those 
concepts were useful and delicate for ordinary Afghans is not clear. Much of the 
nationalism activities happened in Kabul, a Persianate place that was connected 
intellectually and materially to other regional and global Persianate and urban centers. In 
this process, a certain class of Afghans, such as Mahmud Tarzi and Nader Shah and his 
family who had access to external resources, played important roles.  
The Afghan nationalists’ activities in this period were also similar in many ways to 
nationalistic programs of countries such as Iran, Turkey, and nationalists in South Asia. 
Amanullah’s reforms are, for example, mentioned to be similar to those of the reforms 
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that Reza Shah and Mustafa Kamal Ataturk implemented in Iran and Turkey. A future 
comparative analysis of them will be useful.  
In addition to the problem of Kabul, a city that did not (and does not) represent 
Afghanistan, the Afghans were (and are) a multiethnic, multiracial, multicultural, multi-
linguistic, and multi-religious people. This diversity makes nationalism in Afghanistan a 
complex subject to study in addition to the problem of Kabul, problem of illiteracy of the 
majority of Afghan people, problem of elitism, and problem of state-sanctioned 
nationalism. For example, a complexity of nationalism in Afghanistan is the skewed 
relationship between nationalism and language in Afghanistan. Many writings of Afghan 
nationalists and the state printing publications were in Persian, which was the primary 
language of the state and the elites. Although the relationship between language and 
nationalism is not discussed in this thesis, it would be fruitful and will fill the gap of the 
historiography of Afghanistan to conduct such a study to examine the role of language in 
nationalism in Afghanistan because not all ethnic groups such as Nuristanis, Uzbeks, 
Pashtuns, and others spoke Persian.  
 From what is discussed in this thesis, it can be concluded that nationalism in 
Afghanistan was a colonially constructed idea. Locally, it was an elitist-state-sponsored 
and symbolic idea that was consumed by a certain class of Afghans in Kabul. Therefore, 
because of its elite character and elite consumption, nationalism in Afghanistan did not 
permeate the larger society that was not a part of the so-called roshanfekran class that 
emerged between 1901 and 1929 in Kabul. 
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